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Abstract
This thesis investigates the application of Gro¨bner bases to cryptanalysis
of block ciphers. The basic for the application is an algorithm for solving
systems of polynomial equations via Gro¨bner basis computation. In our case,
polynomial equations describe the key recovery problem for block ciphers,
i.e., the solution of these systems corresponds to the value of the secret key.
First we demonstrate that Gro¨bner basis technique can be successfully
used to break block ciphers, if the algebraic structure of these ciphers is
relatively simple. To show this, we construct two families of block ciphers
that satisfy this condition. However, our ciphers are not trivial, they have
a reasonable block and key size as well as an acceptable number of rounds.
Moreover, using suitable parameters we achieve good resistance of these ci-
phers against differential and linear cryptanalysis. At the same time, we
design our ciphers so that the key recovery problem for each of them can be
described by a system of simple polynomial equations. In addition, parame-
ters of the ciphers can be varied independently. This makes the constructed
families suitable for analysis of algebraic attacks. To study the vulnerable of
such ciphers against Gro¨bner basis attack, we have performed experiments
using the computer algebra system Magma. Results of these experiments are
given and analyzed. Also, for a subset of these ciphers we present an efficient
method to construct zero-dimensional Gro¨bner bases w.r.t. a degree-reverse
lexicographical term order without a polynomial reduction. This reduces the
key recovery problem to the problem of Gro¨bner basis conversion. Using
known complexity bounds for the last problem, we estimate the maximum
resistance of these ciphers against Gro¨bner basis attacks.
We show that our method can be also applied to the AES block cipher.
In the thesis we describe the AES key recovery problem in the form of a
total-degree Gro¨bner basis, explain how this Gro¨bner basis can be obtained,
and study the cryptanalytic significance of this result.
Next, we investigate the semi-regularity of several polynomial represen-
tations for iterated block ciphers. We demonstrate that the constructed
Gro¨bner basis for the AES is semi-regular. Then we prove that polynomial
systems that are similar to the BES quadratic equations are not semi-regular
as well as the AES systems of quadratic equations over GF(2) are not semi-
regular over GF(2).
Finally, we propose a new method of side-channel cryptanalysis - algebraic
collision attacks - and explain it by the example of the AES. The method is
based on the standard power analysis technique, which is applied to derive
an additional information from an implementation of a cryptosystem. In
our case, this information is about generalized internal collisions occurring
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between S-boxes of the block cipher. However, we use a new approach to
recover the secret key from the obtained information. Taking into account
a specific structure of the attacked cryptographic algorithm, we express the
detected collisions as a system of polynomial equations and use Gro¨bner
bases to solve this system. This approach provides significant advantages
both in terms of measurements and post-processing complexity. Also, we
use non-collisions to optimize our method. For the AES block cipher, we
demonstrate several efficient algebraic collision attacks. The first of them
works in the known-plaintext scenario and requires 5 measurements to derive
the full secret key within several hours on a PC with success probability 0.93.
This attack with 4 measurements recovers key in about 40% of all cases. The
second attack works in the known plaintext/ciphertext pair scenario but leads
to more efficient results: the key can be obtained in several seconds of oﬄine
computations with success probability of 0.82 for 4 measurements, and with
probability close to 1 for 5 measurements. We also propose a successful
algebraic collision attack on the AES with 3 measurements. The attack has
a probability of 0.42 and needs 4.24 PC hours post-processing.
vZusammenfassung
In der vorliegenden Arbeit untersuchen wir die Anwendbarkeit von Gro¨bner
Basen zur Kryptoanalyse von Blockchiffren. Eine der wichtigsten Anwendun-
gen von Gro¨bner Basen ist der Lo¨sung von Polynomial-Gleichungssystemen.
Viele Kryptoverfahren lassen sich als Gleichungssysteme beschreiben, nicht
alle von solchen Gleichungssystemen sind aber effizient lo¨sbar.
Um zu untersuchen, wie gut Gro¨bner Basis-Angriffe auf Blockchiffre funk-
tionieren und wie das von Parametern (die Gro¨ße des Blockes, die Anzahl der
Runden, sowie der Grad der Polynome) der Chiffre abha¨ngt, haben wir die
zwei Familien der popula¨rsten Klassen von modernen Blockchiffren, Feistel
und SP Netzwerke, konstruiert und analysiert. Wir zeigen, dass es nicht triv-
iale Blockchiffre gibt, die resistent gegen die linearen und differentiellen An-
griffe sind, aber sich algebraisch angreifen lassen. Außerdem ist beschrieben,
wie Gro¨bner Basen bezu¨glich die graduiert-lexikographische Termordnung
fu¨r eine großen Untermenge dieser Blockchiffre effektiv berechnen werden
ko¨nnen, d.h., algebraische Angriffe auf diese Chiffre werden auf das Prob-
lem, eine graduiert-lexikographische Gro¨bner Basis in die lexikographischen
Termordnung umzurechnen, zuru¨ckgefu¨hrt. Durch bekannten Abscha¨tzun-
gen der Komplexita¨t des letzten Problems scha¨tzen wir die Effizient von
Gro¨bner Basis-Angriffe in diesem Fall ab.
Die vorschlagene Methode la¨sst sich auch auf das AES-Verschlu¨sselungs-
verfahren anwenden. In der Dissertation erkla¨ren wir, wie eine graduiert-
lexikographishe Gro¨bner Basis fu¨r den AES bekommen werden kann, sowie
die Auswirkung dieser Gro¨bner Basis auf die Sicherheit des Verfahrens.
Dann betrachten wir die Semi-Regularita¨t von verschiedenen Gleichungs-
systemen, die iterierte Blockchiffren beschreiben. Fu¨r regula¨re und semi-
regula¨re Mengen von Polynomen sind Abscha¨tzungen u¨ber die Komplexita¨t
der Gro¨bner Basis-Algorithmen bekannt. Man weiß auch, dass die Polynome,
die ein Kryptosystem beschreiben, fast nie regula¨r sind. Es wurde aber ver-
mutet, dass diese Polynome semi-regula¨r sind. Wir beweisen, dass diese
Vermutung fu¨r iterierte Blockchiffren meistens falsch ist, u.a., quadratische
Gleichungssysteme fu¨r den AES sind weder semi-regula¨r, noch semi-regula¨r
u¨ber GF(2).
Schließlich demonstrieren wir, dass Seitenkanalangriffe sich durch Gro¨bner
Basis-Methoden verbessern lassen. Unsere Methode basiert auf Kollisionen,
die zwischen verschiedenen S-Boxen bei Verschlu¨sselung einiger Klartexte
auftreten. Es ist bekannt, dass man solche Kollisionen mittels Differen-
tial Power Analysis nachweisen kann, falls die Implementierung des Ver-
fahrens nicht gegen Seitenkanalangriffe abgesichert ist. Um den Schlu¨ssel aus
den festgestellte Kollisionen zu ziehen, beschreiben wir sie als Polynomial-
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Gleichungssysteme. Wir zeigen, dass einige Klassen von diesen Systemen ef-
fektiv durch Gro¨bner Basen lo¨sbar sind. Außerdem werden Nicht-Kollisionen
zur Verbesserung der Methode benutzt. In der Dissertation werden drei
Varianten dieser Angriffe auf den AES pra¨sentiert. Die Erste verwendet
Kollisionen zwischen S-boxen der ersten zwei Runden und braucht 5 oder
4 gemessene Klartexte, um den AES-Schlu¨ssel mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 0.93
bzw. 0.4 zu ziehen. Falls Ein- und Ausgaben des Verfahrens dem Angreifer
bekannt sind, kann man die S-boxen der ersten und letzten Runden betra-
chten. Algebraische Angriffe, die auf Kollisionen zwischen diesen S-boxen
basieren, haben eine bessere Laufzeit sowie eine ho¨here Erfolgswahrschein-
lichkeit. Wenn beide Varianten kombiniert werden, ist man in der Lage, den
AES-Schlu¨ssel mit 3 gemessenen Klartexten mit der Wahrscheinlichkeit 0.42
zu finden.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The concept of Gro¨bner bases for polynomial rings was introduced by Bruno
Buchberger in 1965 [13] (see also [14, 15]). Since that time algorithmic solu-
tions based on Gro¨bner bases were developed for some important problems of
commutative algebra and algebraic geometry such as the ideal membership,
radical and decomposition of ideal, conversion of parametric representation
as well as solving systems of polynomial equations, etc. [5]. Hence it can be
expected that Gro¨bner bases find a wide application area, including theoret-
ical mechanics, biology, chemistry, sudoku solver, robotics, engineering de-
sign, statistics, coding theory, and cryptography. However, sometimes there
is a significant difference (and also some time delay) between the possibility
of application and practical application itself. Furthermore, some applica-
tions have additional requirements or specific conditions. So in cryptography,
many cryptoschemes can be described by systems of polynomial equations,
with secret parameters as variables. From the mathematical point of view,
any of these system can be solved using Gro¨bner bases, this means that the
corresponding algorithm provides with the set of all possible solutions after
a finite number of iterations. But in cryptography only methods that give
solutions faster than an exhaustive search are interesting. The complexity
bounds given in [5, 18, 37, 38] do not allow to claim that the Gro¨bner ba-
sis computation is such method. On the other hand, the HFE public key
cryptosystem was broken using Gro¨bner bases [36]. Further, Gro¨bner basis
attacks on stream ciphers were proposed in [34], and in [52] an application
of Gro¨bner bases to cryptanalysis of the SHA-1 hash function was discussed.
Here it will be shown that Gro¨bner basis algorithms also cannot be ignored
in the case of block ciphers.
In this thesis we study several aspects of algebraic cryptanalysis of block
ciphers. First we analyze Gro¨bner basis attacks in a primary wording: for an
examined block cipher and a known plaintext/ciphertext pair, one describes
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the encryption process by a system of polynomial equations and tries to re-
cover the secret key by solving the obtained system. For that purpose we
have constructed two families of block ciphers. In contrast to [20], where
small scale variants of the AES are considered to investigate algebraic at-
tacks, our ciphers have a reasonable block and key size, 128 bits. Moreover,
applying the wide trail strategy [29] to design the ciphers we make them
resistant against differential and linear cryptanalysis. We show that some of
these ciphers however can be broken by Gro¨bner basis attacks. This state-
ment is based on experimental results as well as theoretical estimations. We
propose an efficient method to obtain Gro¨bner bases w.r.t. a degree-reverse
lexicographical term order for a subset of our block ciphers without a poly-
nomial reduction. This reduces the key recovery problem for these ciphers
to a Gro¨bner basis conversion. Using an upper bound for the complexity
of the FGLM algorithm [35], we estimate the complexity of Gro¨bner basis
attacks. These results are given in Chapter 4 of this thesis, they have been
also published in [17].
The presented method (possibly in a slightly modified form) can be ap-
plied not only to academic ciphers. In this thesis, Chapter 5, this is illustrated
withAES-128. We show how to produce a total-degree Gro¨bner basis for this
cipher using a polynomial representation of the S-box. Important character-
istics of this basis are found, and using them we explain why the application
of the constructed Gro¨bner basis is difficult for cryptanalysis. Note that at
the beginning of 2008, the existence of this Gro¨bner basis has no security
implications for AES. The result have been published in [16].
Further, we verify the conjecture that polynomial systems for block ci-
phers are semi-regular. The concept of semi-regular sequences of polynomials
was introduced by Bardet, Fauge`re, and Salvy [3], [2], [4]. Note that semi-
regular sequences are defined both for homogeneous and non-homogeneous
polynomials. The following has motived us to consider the semi-regularity of
block cipher. First, by conjecture, evolved from computer experiments with
random sequences, most sequences are semi-regular. Secondly, for the case
of semi-regular sequences, the bounds for the complexity of the F5 Gro¨bner
basis algorithm and the XL algorithm were found ([3], [2], [4], and [1]). Com-
bining these two statements, the authors of [3] have given complexity bound
for algebraic attacks on block ciphers under the assumption that polynomial
systems describing these ciphers are semi-regular. In Chapter 6 we check this
assumption for several algebraic representations of iterated block ciphers.
One case is similar to BES equations. Recall that Big Encryption System
(BES), proposed by Murphy and Robshaw, is an embedding for the AES
and can be expressed as a system of quadratic equations over GF(28) [47].
Using BES one can easily obtain quadratic equations over GF(28) for AES.
3Such approach can be applied not only to AES, for example, [44] describes
an embedding for SMS4, a block cipher that is used in the WAPI standard for
protecting data packets in wireless networks. We show that systems derived
this way are not semi-regular. Then we analyze systems of polynomial equa-
tions over GF(2) such as AES equations given in [24] or quadratic equations
obtained for the block cipher Khazad, Misty1, Kasumi, Camellia, and
Serpent in [9]. We prove that such systems are not semi-regular over GF(2).
Thus in two major cases the conjecture about semi-regularity of polynomial
equations for block ciphers is wrong, and hence the estimation obtained for
the complexity of the F5 Gro¨bner basis algorithm and the XL algorithm must
be used carefully. However, semi-regular sequences occur in cryptography:
we show that the above Gro¨bner basis for the AES is semi-regular. But in
this case we get a Gro¨bner basis directly.
Finally we demonstrate that side-channel collision attacks can be im-
proved using Gro¨bner basis techniques. We propose a new cryptanalytic
method called algebraic (side-channel) collision attacks and apply it to AES.
As was shown in [50, 10] and [8], some AES implementations on 8-bit pro-
cessors can be vulnerable against side-channel collision attacks. The main
idea of these attacks is that by comparing the power consumption curves cor-
responding to different S-box operations one can detect whether the inputs
to these S-boxes are equal. This works as follows. An attacker inputs one
or more (possibly chosen) random plaintexts to an AES module. For each
plaintext, the attacker measures and stores the power consumption curves
for the time periods, where appointed S-boxes are executed. Then one looks
for collisions in some S-boxes comparing the corresponding power curves.
Here various methods can be applied: square differences, cross-correlation,
wavelet analysis, etc. The basic attack introduced in [50] uses only internal
collisions between S-boxes in the second round of different AES runs with
chosen plaintexts; and S-boxes at different byte positions are not compared.
However, if all instances of the AES S-box share the same implementation,
for example, if the S-box is implemented as a separate routine, then one can
detect collisions between any two input bytes to the S-box. Such collisions
are called generalized internal collisions and they ware first applied to attack
AES in [10]. After a necessary number of collisions are detected, one tries
to derive the secret key from this information. In [50] internal collisions are
employed to sift key candidates, while [10] uses linear algebra methods. The
basic idea of our method is that a set of generalized internal collision cor-
responds to a system of non-linear equations. We show that some types of
such systems can be quickly solved by Gro¨bner basis computation. Actually
we found three efficient algebraic collision attacks. The first attack are based
on collisions in the first two AES rounds and works in the known-plaintext
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scenario. In the second attack, the system consists of nonlinear equations
corresponding to all collisions within the first round, within the last round
as well as between the first and last rounds; here the plaintext/ciphertext
pairs must be known. We also combine these two approaches in the third
attack. In addition, we demonstrate how non-collisions, i.e., S-box pairs
that do not collide, can be used to optimize these attacks. The algebraic
techniques allows one to mount collision attacks for 3 measurements with a
probability of 0.42 and 4.24 PC hours post-processing, for 4 measurements
with a probability of 0.82 in several seconds of oﬄine computations as well
as for 5 measurements with success probability close to 1 and several seconds
post-processing. This is to be compared to 40 measurements with some non-
negligible post-processing in [50] for a success probability > 0.5 and 6 mea-
surements with approx. 237.15 oﬄine computations and a success probability
of 0.85 or 5 measurements with 245.5 oﬄine computations and a probability
of 0.55 in [10]. We describe algebraic collision attacks in Chapter 7, and a
paper on this subject is [11].
Besides, the thesis have two chapters with preliminaries: Chapter 2 lists
standard results on Gro¨bner basis and semi-regular sequences, and Chapter 3
describes several algebraic representations of the AES block cipher.
Chapter 2
Algebraic Background
This chapter provides a brief overview of Gro¨bner bases and semi-regular
sequences. Good references giving a comprehensive introduction to Gro¨bner
bases theory are [5] and [25]. For more details on semi-regular sequences
we refer the reader to [4] (see also [2]). Statements that are given in this
chapter without proof and explicit references can be found (possibly slightly
modified) in the above works.
Let R = F[X ] = F[x1, . . . , xn] be a polynomial ring in n variables over a
field F. A power product of variables is called a term. By T denote the set of
all terms inR. Then Td ⊂ T is the set of all terms of degree d. Here the degree
of the term t = xd11 . . . x
dn
n is deg(t) =
∑n
i=1 di. The product of a term and an
element c ∈ F is called a monomial.1 Let f =∑ c(a1, . . . , an)xa11 . . . xann ∈ R
be a non-zero polynomial. By definition, put
T (f) = {xa11 . . . xann ∈ T : c(a1, . . . , an) 6= 0} ,
M(f) = {c(a1, . . . , an)xa11 . . . xann : c(a1, . . . , an) 6= 0} ,
and Td(f) = T (f) ∩ Td. The degree of f , denoted by deg(f), is the maximal
d such that Td(f) 6= ∅. We say that f is homogeneous if T (f) ⊂ Tdeg(f). It is
clear that every polynomial f ∈ R \ {0} has a unique representation in the
form
∑m
i=1 fi, where f1, . . . , fm are non-zero homogeneous polynomials such
that deg(f) = deg(f1) > · · · > deg(fm). The homogeneous part f1 of highest
degree is called the degree form of f and is denoted by DF (f).
Next, for any set of polynomials S ⊂ R we define T (S), Td(S), DF (S),
1Let us note that here we adopt the conventions of [5]. For example the authors of [25]
call a product of variables a monomial and refer to the product of variables and a coefficient
as a term.
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and DFd(S) as follows:
T (S) =
⋃
f∈S
T (f); Td(S) = T (S) ∩ Td;
DF (S) = {DF (f) : f ∈ S} ; DFd(S) = DF (S) ∩ Td;
We use 〈S〉 to denote the ideal generated by all f ∈ S. A ideal I ⊂ R
is zero-dimensional if I ∩ F[xi] 6= {0} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In this case, we
write dim I = 0. It can be shown that dim I = 0 iff the F-vector space R/I
is finite-dimensional.
2.1 Term Orders
Definition 2.1.1. A term order  is a linear order on the set of terms T
such that for all t, t1, t2 ∈ T the following conditions hold:
1. 1 = x01 . . . x
0
n  t;
2. if t1 ≺ t2, then t1t ≺ t2t.
If additionally t1 ≺ t2 whenever deg(t1) < deg(t2), then  is called a total
degree term order. In this thesis the following term orders are used.
Lexicographical Term Order: By definition, xd11 . . . x
dn
n ≺lex xe11 . . . xenn iff
there exists some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that di < ei and dj = ej for all
1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1. Note that lex is not a total degree term order, since in
this case
1 ≺lex xn ≺lex x2n ≺lex · · · ≺lex xn−1 ≺lex x2n−1 ≺lex . . .
Degree Lexicographical Term Order: For all t1, t2 ∈ T , define t1 ≺dlex
t2 iff either deg(t1) < deg(t2) or if deg(t1) = deg(t2) and t1 ≺lex t2.
Degree Reverse Lexicographical Term Order: For any t1 =
∏n
i=1 x
di
i ∈
T and t2 =
∏n
i=1 x
ei
i ∈ T we define t1 ≺DRL t2 iff either deg(t1) <
deg(t2) or if deg(t1) = deg(t2) and there exists some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n
such that di > ei and dj = ej for all i + 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Clearly, the
degree lexicographical and degree reverse lexicographical term orders
are examples of total degree term orders.
Let a term order  be fixed. For any two monomials at1 and bt2 with
t1, t2 ∈ T and non-zero coefficients a, b ∈ F, set
at1  bt2 iff t1  t2.
7The maximal element of T (f) w.r.t.  is called the head term of f and
is denoted by HT(f). Likewise, HM(f) = max(M(f)) is called the head
monomial of f , and its coefficient, denoted by HC(f), is the head coefficient
of f . Clearly, HM(f) = HC(f) · HT(f). Also, for any S ⊂ R put
HT(S) = {HT(f) : f ∈ S}.
2.2 Gro¨bner bases
Let  be a term order on T . Let G = {g1, . . . , gm} ⊂ R be a set of poly-
nomials. A polynomial f ∈ R is called reducible modulo G, if there exists
a term t ∈ T (f) that is divisible by some head term of G. Algorithm 1
called polynomial reduction describes the generalized division of f by G for
the multivariate case.
Algorithm 1 Polynomial Reduction
Require: A set G = {g1, . . . , gm} ⊂ R and f ∈ R
1: Set h := f
2: while h is reducible modulo G do
3: Select a monomial mon ∈M(h) such that mon = a · t with a ∈ F and
t = t1 · HT(gi) ∈ T for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m and t1 ∈ T
4: Set h := h− c · t1 · gi, where c = a/HC(gi)
5: end while
6: Return h
The resulting polynomial h is called a normal form of f w.r.t. G and
denoted by NF(f,G). We see that h is not reducible modulo G and there
are f1, . . . , fm ∈ R such that
f −
m∑
i=1
figi = h
and HT(figi)  HT(f) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Since it is possible that by step 3
of the reduction algorithm some terms are divisible by several head terms of
G, the result of the polynomial reduction is in general not uniquely defined.
However any f ∈ R has a unique normal form w.r.t. G whenever G is a
Gro¨bner basis.
Definition 2.2.1. Let I ⊂ R be an ideal. A finite set of polynomials G ⊂ I
is called a Gro¨bner basis of I (w.r.t. ) if 〈HT(G)〉 = 〈HT(I)〉.
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We will say that a set of polynomial G = {g1, . . . , gm} is a Gro¨bner basis
if G is a Gro¨bner basis of the ideal 〈G〉. Also, we refer to Gro¨bner bases w.r.t.
the lexicographical term order (the degree reverse lexicographical term order)
as Lex (DRL) Gro¨bner bases.
For any ideal I ⊂ R there exists a Gro¨bner basis. It can be derived from
any finite set of generators using, for example, the Buchberger algorithm [5],
the Fauge`re F4 [31] or F5 [32] algorithms. These algorithms are based on the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.2.2. Let G ⊂ R be a finite set of polynomials. Then G is
a Gro¨bner basis iff NF(spol(gi, gj), G) = 0 for any gi, gj ∈ G, where the
polynomial spol(gi, gj) called the S-polynomial of gi and gj is given by
spol(gi, gj) =
lcm(HT(gi),HT(gj))
HM(gi)
· gi − lcm(HT(gi),HT(gj))
HM(gj)
· gj.
The basic version of the Buchberger algorithm works as follows.
Algorithm 2 Gro¨bner basis Algorithm
Require: A set G = {g1, . . . , gm} ⊂ R
1: Put CP := {(gi, gj) : for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m}
2: while CP 6= ∅ do
3: Select (f, g) ∈ CP
4: CP := CP \ {(f, g)}
5: if NF(spol(f, g), G) 6= 0 then
6: Put CP := CP ∪ {(g, h) : for all g ∈ G} and G := G ∪ {h}, where
h = NF(spol(f, g), G)
7: end if
8: end while
9: Return G
In this algorithm the elements of CP are called critical pairs. One of the
main ideas of improved versions of Algorithm 2 is that for some critical pairs
it is known without computing normal forms whether their S-polynomials
are reduced to 0. The first statement of the following theorem is the first
Buchberger criterion.
Theorem 2.2.3. Let G ⊂ R be a finite set of polynomials. If the head
term of some f, g ∈ G are coprime, i.e., gcd(HT(f),HT(g)) = 1, then
NF(spol(f, g), G) = 0. In particular, if all elements of the set HT(G) are
pairwise coprime, then G is a Gro¨bner basis.
9Note that there are also other criteria that can be used to reduce the
number of critical pairs.
The next way to speed up the Gro¨bner bases computation is to derive
normal forms for several critical pairs simultaneously by using linear algebra
techniques. This method is applied in the Fauge`re F4 algorithm [31].
Furthermore, computing a Gro¨bner basis w.r.t. a total-degree order usu-
ally is faster than computing a lexicographical Gro¨bner basis for the same
ideal. By this reason the following strategy often is used, if it is necessary
to obtain a Lex Gro¨bner basis. First a DRL Gro¨bner basis is computed,
then it is transformed to a Lex Gro¨bner basisby applied some order change
algorithm. The FGLM algorithm [35] and the Gro¨bner Walk [22] as well as
various variations of them are the most popular algorithms for performing
Gro¨bner basis conversions. Note that the FGLM algorithm as described in
[35] only works for zero-dimensional ideals, while the Gro¨bner Walk does not
have such restriction.
The time complexity of the FGLM algorithm is estimated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.2.4 (Theorem 5.1 of [35]). Let G1 ⊂ R be a Gro¨bner basis
w.r.t. a term order 1 of a zero-dimensional polynomial ideal I, and D =
dim(R/I). Then by the FGLM algorithm we can convert G1 into a Gro¨bner
basis G2 w.r.t. a term order 2 in O(nD3) field operations.
For the space complexity of the algorithm, no bound is given in the orig-
inal paper. We note that the dominant memory requirement of the FGLM
algorithm is a D × nD matrix over F. Thus the memory usage of the algo-
rithm is upper bounded by d(nD2 log2(F))/8e+ o(1) bytes.
We see that the complexity of the FGLM algorithm depends on the di-
mension of the F-vector space R/I. This dimension can be computed as
follows.
Theorem 2.2.5. Let G be a Gro¨bner basis of the ideal I ⊂ R. Then
dim(R/I) = # {t ∈ T : HT(f) - t for all f ∈ I}
= # {t ∈ T : HT(g) - t for all g ∈ G} .
For the Gro¨bner Walk, the running time strongly depends on the source
and the target term order. No usable tight bounds on its time nor its space
complexity are currently known to the author of this thesis.
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2.3 Two Applications of Gro¨bner bases
Using Gro¨bner bases one can solve various problems in a polynomial ring,
for example, the ideal membership and the equality of ideals, intersection
of ideals and multivariate interpolation, radical and primary decomposition
of ideal as well as invertibility of polynomial maps and solving polynomial
systems. Now we describe two such applications of Gro¨bner bases, deciding
the ideal membership problem and solving systems of polynomial equations.
2.3.1 Deciding the Ideal Membership Problem
Let G = {g1, . . . , gn} ⊂ R be a finite set of polynomials and f ∈ R. The
ideal membership problem is to decide if f ∈ 〈G〉. The following theorem
shows how Gro¨bner bases can be used to solve this problem.
Theorem 2.3.1. Let G ⊂ R be a Gro¨bner basis. Then any f ∈ R has a
unique normal form w.r.t. G. Moreover, f ∈ 〈G〉 iff NF(f,G) = 0.
Thus, to determine whether a polynomial f lies in an ideal I ⊂ R, it
is sufficient to reduce f modulo some Gro¨bner basis of I. In chapter 5 we
construct a DRL Gro¨bner basis for the block cipher AES and study its
application for testing key bytes.
2.3.2 Solving Systems of Polynomial Equations
The main application of Gro¨bner bases considered in this thesis is solving
systems of multivariate polynomial equations. In the following chapters we
describe the key recovery problem for several scenarios of attacks on block
ciphers as polynomial systems over finite fields and show that some of these
systems can be solved efficiently using Gro¨bner bases. Here a general algo-
rithm for solving polynomial system is given.
Let S = {p1 = 0, . . . , pm = 0: pi ∈ R for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m} be a system of
polynomial equations in n variables. By
VS = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Fn : p1(a1, . . . , an) = · · · = pm(a1, . . . , an) = 0}
denote the set of all solution of the system S in the closure of F. It can be
proved that VS is finite iff the ideal 〈p1, . . . , pm〉 is zero-dimensional. Let G
be a Gro¨bner basis w.r.t. an arbitrary term order of 〈p1, . . . , pm〉. For short,
we will say that G is a Gro¨bner basis of S. There is a useful criterion for
polynomial ideals to be zero-dimensional.
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Theorem 2.3.2. Let G be a Gro¨bner basis of an ideal I. Then dim I = 0
iff for any i = 1, n there is a polynomial g ∈ G such that HT(g) = xdii .
Thus any Gro¨bner basis of a polynomial system shows whether the num-
ber of zeroes of this system is finite. A Gro¨bner basis G is called reduced
if no g ∈ G is reducible modulo G \ {g} and the head coefficient of each
polynomial of G equals 1. A reduced Gro¨bner basis can be derived from any
Gro¨bner basis G = {g1, . . . , gm} by the following procedure. Let G0 = G.
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, first put Gi := Gi−1 \ {gi}, and if HT(gi) 6∈ HT(Gi), then
Gi := Gi ∪ {HC(gi)−1 · NF(gi, Gi)}.
Then Gm is a reduced Gro¨bner basis of 〈G〉. Note that for any ideal there
exists a unique reduced Gro¨bner basis. The following theorem describe the
relation between VS and the reduced Gro¨bner basis of S.
Theorem 2.3.3. Let S be a system of polynomial equations. Then
1. VS = ∅ iff G = {1}, where G is the reduced Gro¨bner basis of S w.r.t.
an arbitrary term order.
2. VS = {(a1, . . . , an)} for some ai ∈ F iff G = {x1 + a1, . . . , xn + an},
where G is the reduced Gro¨bner basis of S w.r.t. an arbitrary term
order.
3. VS is finite iff for any i = 1, n there exists a polynomial gi ∈ F[x1, . . . , xi]
such that xdii + gi ∈ G with some di ≥ 1, where G is the reduced Lex
Gro¨bner basis of S and xdii lex HT(gi).
As in the case of linear equations, some variables are (algebraic) inde-
pendent w.r.t. S, if the set VS is infinite. However we show below that all
systems considered in this thesis have finite number of solutions, and hence
we can assume that S is so. From Theorem 2.3.3, we get an algorithm for
solving systems of polynomial equations using Gro¨bner bases (Algorithm 3).
The set VS consists of all zeroes of the system S in the algebraic closure of F.
Clearly, the set VS of the solutions of S in F can be obtained, if in Algorithm 3
only the F-zeroes of univariate polynomials are selected. For any finite field
F however there exists also an other way to derive VS = VS ∩Fn. Let F have
q elements. Then for any α ∈ F, we have α ∈ F iff the relation αq = α holds.
The equations
xqi + xi = 0
are called field equations. Thus the set of the zeroes of the system
S′ = S ∪ {xqi + xi = 0: 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
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Algorithm 3 Solving Systems of Polynomial Equations
Require: A system S = {p1 = · · · = pm = 0: pi ∈ R for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m}
1: Compute the reduced DRL Gro¨bner basis GDRL of the ideal 〈p1, . . . , pm〉.
2: if GDRL = {1} then
3: Return VS = ∅
4: else if GDRL = {x1 + a1, . . . , xn + an} then
5: Return VS = {(a1, . . . , an)}
6: else
7: Derive the reduced Lex Gro¨bner basis Glex form GDRL using a Gro¨bner
basis conversion algorithm.
8: Compute VS as follows. First compute all zeros Z1 of the univariate
polynomial xd11 + g1 ∈ Glex ∩ F[x1]. Then substitute each z ∈ Z1
into each element of Glex, and compute all zeros Z2,z of the resulting
univariate polynomials in x2, and so on.
9: Return VS
10: end if
is VS′ = VS ∩ Fn = VS and can be found by Algorithm 3. Note that this
strategy is good for finite fields with a relative small number of elements.
Moreover, for the case of GF(2) with the field equations there exist several
improved implementation of Gro¨bner basis computation algorithms Poly-
BoRi [12], magma. If a finite field has a large number of elements, it is
usually more efficient to compute a Gro¨bner basis of S first, and then to
select the zeroes of S in this field.
2.4 Semi-Regular Sequences
First we define the degree of regularity for polynomial ideals.
Let  be a total degree term order. In this case we have HT(f) =
HT(DF (f)) for any f ∈ R, where DF (f) is the degree form of a polynomial
f . By definition, put
E(S) = T \ HT(S) and Ed(S) = E(S) ∩ Td
for all set of polynomials S ⊂ R. Let I be an ideal.
The Hilber function of I is the map H(I, ·) : Z≥0 → Z≥0 such that
H(I, d) = #Ed(I) = #Td −#HTd(I)
for all d ≥ 0.
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Further, the power series ∑
d≥0
H(I, d)zd
is called the Hilbert series of I.
From Theorem 2.3.2, it follows easily that dim I = 0 iff there is a number
d0 such that H(I, d0) = 0. The degree of regularity for a zero-dimensional
ideal I is defined by
Dreg(I) = min {d ≥ 0: H(I, d) = 0}
It is clear that if dim I = 0, then H(I, d) = 0 for all d ≥ Dreg(I), and hence
the Hilbert series is a polynomial.
If dim I 6= 0, then we define the degree of regularity of I to be ∞. We
agree to the convention that n <∞, for all n ∈ Z.
2.4.1 General Case
To define semi-regular sequence, we describe trivial relations for a set of
polynomials. A semi-regular sequence has no other relations up to degree
of regularity. Moreover, the Gro¨bner basis algorithm F5 does not generate
useless critical pairs that are obtained from trivial relations [32],[2].
Let P = {f1, . . . , fm} be a set of polynomials. Before computing a
Gro¨bner basis from P , the algorithm F5 constructs Gro¨bner bases for the
ideals 〈f1〉, 〈f1, f2〉, . . . , 〈f1, . . . , fm−1〉. Like other Gro¨bner basis algorithms,
it creates new polynomials using two basic operations, the multiplication
by a monomial, and the reduction by a set of polynomials. Clearly, com-
putations whose result is the zero polynomial are unnecessary. In some
cases, it is known that the result of operations is 0. One such example is
given in Theorem 2.2.3. Further, if g ∈ 〈f1, . . . , fi−1〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then
gfi ∈ 〈f1, . . . , fi−1〉. In particular, fifj = fjfi for all i, j.
Definition 2.4.1. Suppose (f1, . . . , fm) is a sequence of homogeneous poly-
nomials, and for any i = 1, . . . ,m there is no polynomial g /∈ 〈f1, . . . , fi−1〉
such that gfi ∈ 〈f1, . . . , fi−1〉 and deg(gfi) < Dreg(I), where I = 〈f1, . . . , fm〉.
Then this sequence is called semi-regular.
A sequence of non-homogeneous polynomial (f1, . . . , fm) is semi-regular
if the sequence of their degree forms (DF (f1), . . . , DF (fm)) is semi-regular.
If for a sequence (f1, . . . , fm) and some 1 ≤ i ≤ m there exists a poly-
nomial g /∈ 〈f1, . . . , fi−1〉 such that gfi ∈ 〈f1, . . . , fi−1〉 and deg(gfi) = d <
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Dreg(I), then we will say that the sequence has a non-trivial relation of degree
d.
For any power series P =
∑∞
i=0 αiz
i put [P ] =
∑D−1
i=0 αiz
i, where
D = min{d : αd ≤ 0}
In [4] the authors give the following criterion for a sequence of polynomials
to be semi-regular.
Theorem 2.4.2. A sequence of homogeneous polynomials (f1, . . . , fm) is
semi-regular iff the Hilbert series of the ideal I = 〈f1, . . . , fm〉 equals[∏m
i=1(1− zdi)
(1− z)n
]
,
where di = deg fi.
Since the Hilbert series is dependent only on the ideal, we have:
Corollary 2.4.3. Let pi be a permutation of {1, . . . ,m}. If (f1, . . . , fm) is
semi-regular, then
(
fpi(1), . . . , fpi(m)
)
is also semi-regular.
Thus we can say that a set of polynomial is semi-regular or not. We will
say also that the system of equations is semi-regular, if the set of polynomials
of this system is semi-regular.
Corollary 2.4.4. Let F = (f1, . . . , fm) be a sequence of homogeneous poly-
nomials.
1. If m ≤ n then F is semi-regular iff F is regular.
2. If m ≥ n and F is semi-regular, then dim (〈f1, . . . , fm〉) = 0.
2.4.2 Semi-Regular Sequence over GF(2)
Let R2 = GF(2)[x1, . . . , xn] and {f1, . . . , fm} ⊂ R2. As it was discussed in
Subsection 2.3.2, sometimes it is necessary to compute a Gro¨bner basis of
the ideal
〈f1, . . . , fm, x21 + x1, . . . , x2n + xn〉.
In this case, the terms of all polynomials except x2i+xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are square-
free. Furthermore, there are new trivial relations f 2j = fj, where 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Thus the definition of semi-regular sequence over GF(2) is slightly different
from the general case [3]. Let us also remark that in this case the algorithm
F5 can be improved. We refer the reader to [3], [2] for more detail.
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Definition 2.4.5. Suppose (f1, . . . , fm) is a sequence of homogeneous poly-
nomials in R2, and the terms of all polynomials are square-free. If for any
i = 1, . . . ,m there is no polynomial g /∈ 〈x21, . . . , x2n, f1, . . . , fi−1, fi〉 such that
gfi ∈ 〈x21, . . . , x2n, f1, . . . , fi−1〉 and deg(gfi) < Dreg(〈x21, . . . , x2n, f1, . . . , fm〉),
then the sequence is called semi-regular over GF(2).
A sequence of non-homogeneous polynomial (f1, . . . , fm) is semi-regular
over GF(2) if so is the sequence of their degree forms (DF (f1), . . . , DF (fm)).
The degree Dreg(〈x21, . . . , x2n, f1, . . . , fm〉) is called the degree of regularity
of (f1, . . . , fm) over GF(2).
The criterion for a sequence of polynomials to be semi-regular over GF(2)
is the following.
Theorem 2.4.6. A sequence of homogeneous polynomials (f1, . . . , fm) is
semi-regular over GF(2) iff the Hilbert series of 〈x21, . . . , x2n, f1, . . . , fm〉 equals[
(1 + z)n∏m
i=1(1 + z
di)
]
,
where di = deg fi.
Corollary 2.4.7. Let pi be a permutation. If (f1, . . . , fm) is semi-regular
over GF(2), then so is (fpi(1), . . . , fpi(m)).
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Chapter 3
AES
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [48] is a block cipher with a
relatively simple algebraic structure. It can be elegantly described using
only operations over the finite field GF(28). In addition, two representations
in the form of systems of polynomial quadratic equations in several variables
have been proposed for AES [24, 47, 21]. In this chapter we briefly describe
AES and show how the polynomial systems for it can be obtained. Good
references for the design of Rijndael, the cipher that is used in AES, are [28]
and [27].
3.1 Description of AES
According to [48], the length of each input and output data blocks for AES
is equal to 128 bits, the key length may be 128, 192, or 256 bits. AES-n is
the standard designation for AES with n-bit key (n = 128, 192, and 256).
Like most modern block cipher, AES is an iterated block cipher, i.e., its en-
cryption consists of several rounds. An input of the first round is a plaintext ,
an input of any other round, internal state, is an output of the previous one.
An output of the last round, final state, is a ciphertext. In each round a state
is transformed using a round function. The round function of AES depends
on a 128-bit round key, which is derived from a cipher key using the AES
key schedule. Let R be the number of rounds, then
R =

10, for AES-128;
12, for AES-192;
14, for AES-256.
Let us consider the AES round function. It consists of four state trans-
formations: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey. Note
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that in the first and last round the AES round function is slightly modified.
In order to make inputs of the first round dependent on the key, an initial
round key is added to a plaintext. The last round has no MixColumns trans-
formation. This makes the processes of the AES encryption and decryption
more similar. The AES encryption is given by Algorithm 4. There are sev-
Algorithm 4 AES encryption
Require: plaintext P , round keys (K0, K1, . . . , KR)
Ensure: ciphertext C
1: Σ0 = AddRoundKey(P,K0)
2: for i = 1, . . . ,R− 1 do
3: tmp = SubBytes(Σi−1)
4: tmp = ShiftRows(tmp)
5: tmp = MixColumns(tmp)
6: Σi = AddRoundKey(tmp,Ki)
7: end for
8: tmp = SubBytes(ΣR−1)
9: tmp = ShiftRows(tmp)
10: C = AddRoundKey(tmp,KR)
eral ways to describe the transformations of the AES round function, for
example using tables or bit operations. We describe them using finite field
operations.
State Representation
Each AES state block consists of 16 bytes. Any byte b = b7b6 . . . b1b0 =∑7
i=0 bi · 2i can be obviously represented as the element β =
∑7
i=0 bi · ξi of
the finite field GF(28) = GF(2)[ξ], where ξ8 + ξ4 + ξ3 + ξ + 1 = 0 holds. We
will use also the inverse representation to write a finite field element shortly.
Example 3.1.1.
01 = 0000 0001↔ 1 ∈ F; 63 = 0110 0011↔ ξ6 + ξ5 + ξ + 1 ∈ F;
02 = 0000 0010↔ ξ ∈ F; AC = 1010 1100↔ ξ7 + ξ5 + ξ3 + ξ2 ∈ F.
Thus we see that any state block Σ can be interpreted as the square
matrix over GF(28): 
σ0 σ4 σ8 σ12
σ1 σ5 σ9 σ13
σ2 σ6 σ10 σ14
σ3 σ7 σ11 σ15
 .
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SubBytes
The first transformation of the AES round function is SubBytes. In this
step, a bijective function S : F→ F, called S-box , is applied to each element
of a state independently.
S(σ0) S(σ4) S(σ8) S(σ12)
S(σ1) S(σ5) S(σ9) S(σ13)
S(σ2) S(σ6) S(σ10) S(σ14)
S(σ3) S(σ7) S(σ11) S(σ15)

The AES S-box is the composition of the multiplicative inverse f−1 in
GF(28), a GF(2)-linear mapping L, and the addition of the element 63. By
definition,
f−1(θ) = θ254 =
{
θ−1, if θ ∈ F \ {0};
0, if θ = 0.
The polynomial representation of L over GF(28) is given by
8Fx2
7
+ B5x2
6
+ 01x2
5
+ F4x2
4
+ 25x2
3
+ F9x2
2
+ 09x2 + 05x.
Denote this polynomial by fL. Like other components of the AES round
function, the GF(2)-linear mapping L is invertible, and its inverse L′ can be
expressed as the following polynomial over GF(28):
fL′(x) = 6Ex
27 + DBx2
6
+ 59x2
5
+ 78x2
4
+ 5Ax2
3
+ 7Fx2
2
+ FEx2 + 05x.
Since S(σ) = fL(f−1(σ)) + 63, we obtain the following polynomial repre-
sentation of the AES S-box:
05x254+09x253+F9x251+25x247+F4x239+01x223+B5x191+8Fx127+63. (3.1)
We see that this polynomial is sparse. The polynomial over GF(28) corre-
sponding to the inverse S-box, S ′(σ) = f−1(fL′(σ + 63)), is denser and given
in Appendix A.
ShiftRows
The next transformation is ShiftRows. The ith row of the state matrix is
cyclically shifted over i elements to left (0 ≤ i ≤ 3).
σ0 σ4 σ8 σ12
σ1 σ5 σ9 σ13
σ2 σ6 σ10 σ14
σ3 σ7 σ11 σ15
 7→

σ0 σ4 σ8 σ12
σ5 σ9 σ13 σ1
σ10 σ14 σ2 σ6
σ15 σ3 σ7 σ11
 .
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MixColumns
To make each output element of state dependent on several input elements,
a matrix multiplication is used. This step is called MixColumns. Let
D =

02 03 01 01
01 02 03 01
01 01 02 03
03 01 01 02
 , (3.2)
and Σ be an input state of MixColumns, then the output state is Σ′ = DΣ.
For D, the inverse matrix is
D−1 =

0E 0B 0D 09
09 0E 0B 0D
0D 09 0E 0B
0B 0D 09 0E
 .
AddRoundKey
Unlike the first three transformations, AddRoundKey depends on a secret
parameter, a round key. The round key K has the length of 128 bits, and is
interpreted as the 4 × 4-matrix over GF(28). Then this matrix is added to
the state matrix Σ.
Σ +K =

σ0 + k0 σ4 + k4 σ8 + k8 σ12 + k12
σ1 + k1 σ5 + k5 σ9 + k9 σ13 + k13
σ2 + k2 σ6 + k6 σ10 + k10 σ14 + k14
σ3 + k3 σ7 + k7 σ11 + k11 σ15 + k15
 .
In order to derive round keys, the AES key schedule is applied to a cipher
key. This routine can be described also using operations over GF(28).
Key Schedule
Since there are slight differences in the key schedules for AES-128, AES-192,
and AES-256, we consider these variants separately.
The 1th case: AES-128.
In the case of AES-128, a cipher key, K, is 16 bytes long and can be
interpreted as the 4×4-matrix over GF(28). The rounds keysK0, K1, . . . , K10
are generated from K as follows. First, the initial round key K0 is defined by
K0 = K. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, the ith round key Ki is derived from the previous
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one using the following formulas. Let the jth element of Ki be denoted by
ki,j with 0 ≤ j ≤ 15. Then
ki,0 = S(ki−1,13) + ki−1,0 + ξi−1, ki,1 = S(ki−1,14) + ki−1,1,
ki,2 = S(ki−1,15) + ki−1,2, ki,3 = S(ki−1,12) + ki−1,3,
and ki,j = ki,j−4 + ki−1,j for 4 ≤ j ≤ 15.
The 2th case: AES-192.
In this case the length of a cipher key, K, is 24 bytes. First an expanded
key is derived from the cipher key. The expanded key consists of 9 blocks
EK0, . . . , EK8, and each block has 24 elements of the finite field GF(2
8).
For i ≥ 1 the ith block EKi = (eki,0, . . . , eki,23) is generated from EKi−1,
where EK0 = K. The generation formulas are similar to the formulas in the
AES-128 case:
eki,0 = S(eki−1,21) + eki−1,0 + ξi−1, eki,1 = S(eki−1,22) + eki−1,1,
eki,2 = S(eki−1,23) + eki−1,2, eki,3 = S(eki−1,20) + eki−1,3,
and eki,j = eki,j−4 + eki−1,j for 4 ≤ j ≤ 23.
After then the round keys K0, . . . , K12 are selected from the expanded
key as follows. For 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, we have
K3i = (ek2i,0, . . . , ek2i,15),
K3i+1 = (ek2i,16, . . . , ek2i,23, ek2i+1,0, . . . , ek2i+1,7),
K3i+2 = (ek2i+1,8, . . . , ek2i+1,23);
and K12 = (ek8,0, . . . , ek8,15). The elements ek8,16, . . . , ek8,23 of EK8 are not
used.
The 3th case: AES-256.
Like the AES-192 case, the key schedule for AES-256 consists of the
key expansion and the round key selection. The expanded key has 8 blocks
EK0, . . . , EK7 ∈ GF(28)32. As above, EK0 = K. For i ≥ 1 the elements
eki,0, . . . , eki,31 of the ith block EKi is derived in the following way:
for j = 0, 1, 2, 3,
eki,0 = S(eki−1,21) + eki−1,0 + ξi−1, eki,1 = S(eki−1,22) + eki−1,1,
eki,2 = S(eki−1,23) + eki−1,2, eki,3 = S(eki−1,20) + eki−1,3;
for 4 ≤ j ≤ 15,
eki,j = eki,j−4 + eki−1,j;
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for j = 16, 17, 18, 19,
eki,j = S(eki,j−4) + eki−1,j;
and for 20 ≤ j ≤ 31,
eki,j = eki,j−4 + eki−1,j.
Then the round keys K0, . . . , K14 are taken from the expanded key as
follows. For 0 ≤ i ≤ 6, we have
K2i = (eki,0, . . . , eki,15),
K2i+1 = (eki,16, . . . , eki,31);
and K14 = (ek7,0, . . . , ek7,15). Note that since the elements ek7,16, . . . , ek7,31
of EK7 are not used, they are not computed.
3.2 Algebraic Representations of the AESKey
Recovery Problem
Let m AES plaintext/ciphertext pairs be known, where m ≥ 1 for AES-128,
and m ≥ 2 for AES-192, and AES-256. Then using the AES description
given above it is easy to express the AES key recovery problem as a system
of polynomial equations over GF(28). However in this case the output of the
S-box is given by the polynomial S in the input, and hence the non-linear
equations of the obtained system have degree 254. For the AES block cipher,
there exist also several algebraic representations in the form of multivariate
polynomial systems of quadratic equations over GF(2) [24] as well as over
GF(28) [47]. Here we briefly describe these three AES expressions.
3.2.1 System of Equations over GF(28)
Let ((p0, . . . , p15), (c0, . . . , c15)) ∈ F16 × F16 be a known plaintext/ciphertext
pair. Denote by xi,j the variable referring to the jth element of the state after
the ith AddRoundKey, and by ki,j the variable referring to the jth element of
the ith round key for 0 ≤ i ≤ 10, and 0 ≤ j ≤ 15. The system of equations
over GF(28) in xi,j, and ki,j consists of the four following parts:
1. plaintext/ciphertext equations
x0,0 + k0,0 + p0 = 0 x10,0 + c0 = 0
...
...
x0,15 + k0,15 + p15 = 0 x10,15 + c15 = 0
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2. equations, which correspond to the ith round of the AES encryption
with 1 ≤ i ≤ R− 1:
xi,0 + ki,0 xi,4 + ki,4 xi,8 + ki,8 xi,12 + ki,12
xi,1 + ki,1 xi,5 + ki,5 xi,9 + ki,9 xi,13 + ki,13
xi,2 + ki,2 xi,6 + ki,6 xi,10 + ki,10 xi,14 + ki,14
xi,3 + ki,3 xi,7 + ki,7 xi,11 + ki,11 xi,15 + ki,15
+
+D ·

S(xi−1,0) S(xi−1,4) S(xi−1,8) S(xi−1,12)
S(xi−1,5) S(xi−1,9) S(xi−1,13) S(xi−1,1)
S(xi−1,10) S(xi−1,14) S(xi−1,2) S(xi−1,6)
S(xi−1,15) S(xi−1,3) S(xi−1,7) S(xi−1,11)
 = 0,
(3.3)
where the polynomial function S is given by (3.1), and the matrix D
is given by (3.2). For example, for
xi,0 = ki,0 + 02S(xi−1,0) + 03S(xi−1,5) + 01S(xi−1,10) + 01S(xi−1,15),
we have
0Ax254i−1,0+0Fx
254
i−1,5+ 05x
254
i−1,10+05x
254
i−1,15+ 12x
253
i−1,0+1Bx
253
i−1,5 +
09x253i−1,10+09x
253
i−1,15+ E9x
251
i−1,0+10x
251
i−1,5+ F9x
251
i−1,10+F9x
251
i−1,15 +
4Ax247i−1,0+6Fx
247
i−1,5+ 25x
247
i−1,10+25x
247
i−1,15+ F3x
239
i−1,0+07x
239
i−1,5 +
F4x239i−1,10+F4x
239
i−1,15+ 02x
223
i−1,0+03x
223
i−1,5+ 01x
223
i−1,10+01x
223
i−1,15 +
71x191i−1,0+C4x
191
i−1,5+ B5x
191
i−1,10+B5x
191
i−1,15+ 05x
127
i−1,0+8Ax
127
i−1,5 +
8Fx127i−1,10+8Fx
127
i−1,15+ 01xi,0+01ki,0+ 63 =0.
3. equations for the last round:
x10,0 + k10,0 x10,4 + k10,4 x10,8 + k10,8 x10,12 + k10,12
x10,1 + k10,1 x10,5 + k10,5 x10,9 + k10,9 x10,13 + k10,13
x10,2 + k10,2 x10,6 + k10,6 x10,10 + k10,10 x10,14 + k10,14
x10,3 + k10,3 x10,7 + k10,7 x10,11 + k10,11 x10,15 + k10,15
+
+

S(x9,0) S(x9,4) S(x9,8) S(x9,12)
S(x9,5) S(x9,9) S(x9,13) S(x9,1)
S(x9,10) S(x9,14) S(x9,2) S(x9,6)
S(x9,15) S(x9,3) S(x9,7) S(x9,11)
 = 0,
4. key schedule equations
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
ki,0
ki,1
ki,2
ki,3
ki,4
...
ki,15

=

ki−1,0 + S(ki−1,13) +ξi−1
ki−1,1 + S(ki−1,14)
ki−1,2 + S(ki−1,15)
ki−1,3 + S(ki−1,12)
ki−1,4 + ki,0
...
ki−1,15 + ki,11

. (3.4)
3.2.2 Systems of Quadratic Equations over GF(2)
To derive a system of equations over GF(2) for AES, the finite field F is
considered as a vector space over GF(2). In this case, each bit of the internal
states and the round keys is a new variable, and for any variable v we have
v2+v = 0. We use v
(e)
i,j to denote the eth bit variable of the jth byte of a byte
array V in round i, where 0 ≤ e ≤ 7, 0 ≤ j ≤ 15 and 0 ≤ i ≤ 9. To describe
AES elegantly, the three following byte arrays are used for each round:
- the internal state before the SubBytes transformation,
Xi = (xi,0, . . . ,xi,15);
- the internal state after the SubBytes transformation,
Yi = (yi,0, . . . ,yi,15);
- the round key,
Ki+1 = (ki+1,0, . . . ,ki+1,15).
In addition, let K0 = (k0,0, . . . ,k0,15) be a vector of variables for the initial
key. Thus we work in the polynomial ring
RA2 = GF(2)
[
x
(e)
i,j , y
(e)
i,j , k
(e)
i+1,j, k
(e)
0,j
]
with 0 ≤ e ≤ 7, 0 ≤ j ≤ 15 and 0 ≤ i ≤ 9. By ((p0, . . . ,p15), (c0, . . . , c15))
denote a known plaintext/ciphertext pair.
The only operation in AES that is non-linear over GF(2) is SubBytes. It
is based on the S-box, which can be expressed as a system of quadratic equa-
tions over GF(2) in input/output variables. To derive this system, consider
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the following equations with unknown coefficients ar,s, br,s, cr,s, d ∈ GF(2):
6∑
e1=0
7∑
e2=e1+1
(ae1,e2x
(e1)x(e2) + ce1,e2y
(e1)y(e2)) +
7∑
e3=0
7∑
e4=0
be3,e4x
(e3)y(e4)+
+
7∑
e5=0
(ae5,e5x
(e5) + ce5,e5y
(e5)) + d = 0.
Substituting the bits of each element α ∈ F for the corresponding input
variables x(e) and the bits of S(α) ∈ F for the corresponding output variables
y(e) in this equation, we obtain a system of 256 linear equations over GF(2)
in the 137 unknowns {ar,s, cr,s : 0 ≤ r ≤ s ≤ 7} ∪ {br,s : 0 ≤ r, s ≤ 7} ∪ {d}.
Every solution of this system corresponds to the coefficients of some quadratic
equation for the S-box. It can easily be checked that less the field equations
there exist exactly 39 linearly independent quadratic equations for the AES
S-box. Note that if for equations the set of quadratic terms is restricted to
{x(r)y(s) : 0 ≤ r, s ≤ 7}, i.e., ar,s = cr,s = 0 for all r and s, then the system has
23 equations. Thus for the AES encryption we get a set of disjoin systems
of quadratic equations, each of these systems describes the relations between
the variables of xi,j and yi,j for some 0 ≤ j ≤ 15 and 0 ≤ i ≤ 9.
Further, each bit variable ofXi+1 is connected with several bit variables of
Yi and one of Ki+1 by a linear equation. The coefficients of these equations
can be easily derived from the description of the ShiftRows, MixColumns, and
AddRoundKey transformations. Also, we have plaintext/ciphertext equations:
x
(e)
0,j + k
(e)
0,j + p
(e)
j = 0 and y
(e)
9,j + k
(e)
10,j′ + c
(e)
j′ = 0
with 0 ≤ j ≤ 15, 0 ≤ e ≤ 7, and j′ = 5 · j mod 16. Quadratic equations
for the S-boxes in the key schedule can be obtained as stated above. Linear
equations are given by
k
(e)
i+1,j+4 + k
(e)
i+1,j + k
(e)
i,j+4 = 0
for all 0 ≤ e ≤ 7, 0 ≤ j ≤ 11 and 0 ≤ i ≤ 9.
Thus the resulting system consists of 2368 linear equations and 200 · ε+
3968 quadratic equations, where 3968 of the quadratic equations are the field
equations, and ε = 39, if all possible linearly independent equations for the S-
box are included into the system, or ε = 23, if only equations with quadratic
terms in the form of x · y are taken into account. Note that using linear
equations some variables can be eliminated from this system, for example,
either all Yi variables or all Xi variables.
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3.2.3 Embedding in the Big Encryption System (BES)
The block cipher Big Encryption System (BES) was introduced by Murphy
and Robshaw in [47]. This cipher was constructed to be an extension of the
AES. This means that there is an injective map ψ : GF(28)16 → GF(28)16×8
such that if the AES using a cipher key K takes a plaintext P to the cipher-
text C, then the ciphertext ψ(C) is the result of the BES encryption of the
plaintext ψ(P ) using the cipher key ψ(K). Let φ : GF(28) → GF(28)8 be a
vector conjugate mapping such that
φ(σ) =
(
σ2
0
, σ2
1
, σ2
2
, σ2
3
, σ2
4
, σ2
5
, σ2
6
, σ2
7
)
for all σ ∈ GF(28). Then the AES is embedded in the BES using ψ that is
given by
(σ0, . . . , σ15)
T ψ7−→ (φ(σ0), . . . , φ(σ15))T .
The reason of this embedding is that the BES uses only algebraic operations
in GF(28) and can be expressed as a sparse multivariate quadratic system
over GF(28).
Consider the BES and the corresponding system of equations. In the
BES the same finite field F = GF(28) is used as in the AES. Any internal
state and the round keys of the BES can be represented by 16× 8 matrices
over F. In each ofR rounds of the encryption a state is transformed using the
BES round function, which is slightly modified in the last round. This round
function consists of three state transformations: a parallel application of 128
S-boxes, an affine transformation over F, and the round key addition. All
operations are defined so that if an input of the BES encryption is a plaintext
ψ(P ) and a secret key ψ(K) for some P,K ∈ F16, then the first column of
any BES internal state is some internal state of the AES encryption of P
with the secret key K.
We write x
(e)
i,j and w
(e)
i,j for the internal state variables before and after the
ith S-box application and k
(e)
i,j for the ith round key variables.
The BES S-box takes each σ ∈ F to σ254, i.e., here the BES uses only
the first component f−1 of the AES S-box. So we have
x
(e)
i,j · w(e)i,j = 1
for all 0 ≤ e ≤ 7, 0 ≤ j ≤ 15 and 0 ≤ i ≤ 9. Note that the input of the S-box
x = 0 and the corresponding output w = 0 do not satisfy of this equation.
Further, the BES affine transformation process can be divided into several
steps. First an internal state Σ ∈ F16×8 is converted by
Σ′ = Σ · LB,
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where LB is the following 8× 8-matrix over F:
LB =

05 (8F)2
1
(B5)2
2
(01)2
3
(F4)2
4
(25)2
5
(F9)2
6
(09)2
7
09 (05)2
1
(8F)2
2
(B5)2
3
(01)2
4
(F4)2
5
(25)2
6
(F9)2
7
F9 (09)2
1
(05)2
2
(8F)2
3
(B5)2
4
(01)2
5
(F4)2
6
(25)2
7
25 (F9)2
1
(09)2
2
(05)2
3
(8F)2
4
(B5)2
5
(01)2
6
(F4)2
7
F4 (25)2
1
(F9)2
2
(09)2
3
(05)2
4
(8F)2
5
(B5)2
6
(01)2
7
01 (F4)2
1
(25)2
2
(F9)2
3
(09)2
4
(05)2
5
(8F)2
6
(B5)2
7
B5 (01)2
1
(F4)2
2
(25)2
3
(F9)2
4
(09)2
5
(05)2
6
(8F)2
7
8F (B5)2
1
(01)2
2
(F4)2
3
(25)2
4
(F9)2
5
(09)2
6
(05)2
7

.
It is easy to see that for any σ ∈ F we have
φ(σ) · LB = φ(fL(σ)),
where fL is the interpolation polynomial over F for the GF(2)-linear mapping
of the AES S-box. Then the internal state Σ′ is added with the constant
16× 8-matrix C over F
C =
(63)
20 (63)2
1
. . . (63)2
6
(63)2
7
...
...
. . .
...
...
(63)2
0
(63)2
1
. . . (63)2
6
(63)2
7

 16 rows.
Thus the SubBytes transformation of the AES is completely embedded into
the BES round function. The next two linear transformation of the state
matrix correspond to ShiftRows and MixColumns of the AES. The first of
them is the row permutation given by
pi =
(
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12 1 6 11
)
.
After this permutation, the eth column of the resulting state is multiplied on
the left by the 16× 16-matrix Me = (a2ei,j), where M0 = (ai,j) is given by
M0 =

D 0 0 0
0 D 0 0
0 0 D 0
0 0 0 D

with the 4×4-matrix D used in the MixColumns transformation of the AES.
Like in the AES, this operation is not applied in the last round of the BES
encryption.
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In the last operation of theBES round function, the round key in the form
of 16×8-matrix is added to the internal state. Also, before the first round an
initial round key is added to each plaintext. The round keys are generated
from the secret key using the BES key schedule, which is an extension of the
AES key schedule. Let KB ∈ F16×8 be a BES secret key. Then K0 = KB is
an initial key, and the ith round key Ki is generated from Ki−1 as follows:
Ki,0 = SB(Ki−1,13) · LB +Ki−1,0 + C ′ + Vi,
Ki,1 = SB(Ki−1,14) · LB +Ki−1,1 + C ′,
Ki,2 = SB(Ki−1,15) · LB +Ki−1,2 + C ′,
Ki,3 = SB(Ki−1,12) · LB +Ki−1,3 + C ′,
Ki,j = Ki,j−4 +Ki−1,j, for 4 ≤ j ≤ 15.
Here for 0 ≤ i ≤ 10 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 15
• Ki,j is the jth row of the key Ki;
• SB(Ki,j) is the result of the parallel application of the BES S-box to
each element of the row Ki,j;
• the matrix LB is given above, and
C ′ =
(
(63)2
0
, (63)2
1
, . . . , (63)2
6
, (63)2
7
)
;
• the vector Vi of round constants is given by
Vi =
(
(ξi−1)2
0
, (ξi−1)2
1
, . . . , (ξi−1)2
6
, (ξi−1)2
7
)
.
The key recovery problem for the block cipher BES can be described as
follows. Put
RB = F
[
x
(e)
i,j , w
(e)
i,j , k
(e)
i,j , k
(e)
10,j
]
with 0 ≤ i ≤ 9, 0 ≤ j ≤ 15, and 0 ≤ e ≤ 7. Let (p, c) ∈ F16×8 × F16×8 be a
known plaintext/ciphertext pair. The BES systems denoted by SB consists
of equations for the encryption and the key schedule. The BES encryption
of p = (p
(e)
j ) to c = (c
(e)
j ) is given by:
x
(e)
0,j + p
(e)
j + k
(e)
0,j = 0
x
(e)
i,j · w(e)i,j + 1 = 0
x
(e)
i+1,j +
∑
αs,tw
(t)
i,s + k
(e)
i+1,j = 0
x
(e)
9,j · w(e)9,j + 1 = 0
c
(e)
j +
∑
α˜s,tw
(t)
9,s + k
(e)
10,j = 0

i = 0, . . . , 8
j = 0, . . . , 15
e = 0, . . . , 7
(B)
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and the equations for the key schedule are:
k
(e)
i,j + k
(e)
i,j−4 + k
(e)
i−1,j = 0
k
(e)
i−1,15
(∑
βe,s
(
k
(s)
i,0 + k
(s)
i−1,0 + γ
(s)
i
))
+ 1 = 0
k
(e)
i−1,11+t
(∑
βe,s
(
k
(s)
i,t + k
(s)
i−1,t
))
+ 1 = 0

i = 1, . . . , 10
j = 4, . . . , 15
e = 0, . . . , 7
t = 1, . . . , 3
(B′)
All coefficients αi,j, α˜i,j, βi,j, and γ
(e)
i can be obtained from the description
of the BES linear transformation and the key schedule.
Since the BES is an extension of the AES, the system SB also describes
the key recovery problem for the AES. However in this case the relations
between conjugate elements of the internal states and the round keys of the
embedded AES are not taken into account. This relations are given by
(x
(e)
i,j )
2 + x
(e+1)
i,j = 0; (x
(7)
i,j )
2 + x
(0)
i,j = 0;
(w
(e)
i,j )
2 + w
(e+1)
i,j = 0; (w
(7)
i,j )
2 + w
(0)
i,j = 0;
(k
(e)
i,j )
2 + k
(e+1)
i,j = 0; (k
(7)
i,j )
2 + k
(0)
i,j = 0;
(k
(e)
10,j)
2 + k
(e+1)
10,j = 0; (k
(7)
10,j)
2 + k
(0)
10,j = 0;

i = 0, . . . , 9
j = 0, . . . , 15
e = 0, . . . , 6
(B′′)
Denote the system that consists of SB and these equations by SEA. We see
that if v2i + vi+1 = 0 with 0 ≤ i ≤ 7 and v8 = v0, then
v2
8
i + vi = 0
for all vi. Hence system SEA has only solutions in F.
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Chapter 4
Block Ciphers Sensitive to
Gro¨bner Basis Attacks
In order to analyze the power of Gro¨bner basis attacks, we construct two
parameterized families of block ciphers with a simple algebraic structure.
The first family represents Feistel networks, and the other one represents SPN
ciphers. The following parameters of this ciphers can be varied: the length of
blocks, the number of S-boxes, the number of rounds, S-box functions, and
linear transformations. Thus we can study how Gro¨bner basis attacks depend
on this parameters. We show that there are sets of the parameters with which
the ciphers are resistant against differential and linear cryptanalysis, but can
be broken using Gro¨bner basis. Moreover we demonstrate that in some cases
the key recovery problem can be easy reduced to a Gro¨bner basis conversion
problem. Actually we construct a DRL Gro¨bner basis for block ciphers with
a polynomial S-box. Since the time and space complexity of the FGLM
Gro¨bner basis conversion algorithm is known, the theoretical upper bound
for the time and space complexity of Gro¨bner basis attacks on this ciphers
is obtained. The results given in this chapter were presented in [17].
4.1 Flurry and Curry: Two Families of Block
Ciphers
In this section we present two families of iterated block ciphers. The first
family has a Feistel network structure, and is called Flurry. The second
family, called Curry, consists of SPN ciphers similar to Square [26], one
of the Rijndael predecessors. We specify a cipher parameter space, which
satisfies the following two conditions:
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• the Flurry and Curry ciphers must be resistant against differential
and linear cryptanalysis;
• the key recovery problem for this ciphers can be described by a rela-
tively simpler system of polynomial equations.
We construct our ciphers using the wide trail strategy, an approach is
applied to design Square, Rijndael, Twofish, etc. [29, 28]. In order that the
second condition holds, for each cipher we fix a finite field F = GF(2n) =
GF(2)(ξ), where n ∈ {8, 16, 32, 64}, and ξ is a generating element of F over
GF(2), and in the round function all operations are over F. Further, any
internal state of this cipher consists of elements of F. For Flurry ciphers,
the vector representation of the internal states is used, and allCurry internal
states are written in matrix form.
4.1.1 Description of Flurry
First we describe the family Flurry(n,m, r, f,D) of Feistel ciphers, which
depends on the following parameters:
• n,m ∈ N: the plaintext space, the ciphertext space, and the cipher key
space are F2m = GF(2n)2m, i.e., the block and key lengths are equal to
N = 2nm bits; also any round key consists of m elements of F;
• r ∈ N: the number of rounds;
• f : F → F: a non-linear mapping giving the S-Box of the round func-
tion;
• D = (di,j) ∈ Fm×m: a matrix describing the linear transformation of
the round function.
In each round the internal state is split into two halves, L = (l1, . . . , lm) ∈
Fm and R = (r1, . . . , rm) ∈ Fm. Let K = (k1, . . . , km) ∈ Fm be a round key.
It is derived from a cipher key using the Flurry key schedule. Then for
Flurry the round function ρ : Fm × Fm × Fm → Fm × Fm is given by:
ρ(L,R,K) = (R,G(R,K) + L),
where G : Fm×Fm → Fm is composed of the round key addition, the parallel
application of m S-Boxes, and the linear transformation using the matrix D:
G(r1, . . . , rm, k1, . . . , km) = D ×

f(r1 + k1)
f(r2 + k2)
...
f(rm + km)
 .
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A plaintext (L0, R0) is encrypted into a ciphertext (Lr, Rr) by implementing
the round function ρ exactly r times with an additional key addition after
the last round transformation:
(Le, Re) = ρ(Le−1, Re−1, Ke) e = 1, 2, . . . , r − 1
(Lr, Rr) = ρ(Lr−1, Rr−1, Kr) + (Kr+1, Kr+2)
The inverse round function ρ−1 is given by
ρ−1(L,R,K) = (G(L,K) +R,L),
and the decryption of a ciphertext is described as:
(Lr−1, Rr−1) = ρ−1(Lr +Kr+1, Rr +Kr+2, Kr)
(Le−1, Re−1) = ρ−1(Le, Re, Ke) e = r − 1, r − 2, . . . , 1
The key schedule
To generate the round keys from a cipher key, Flurry uses an affine transfor-
mation over F. The cipher key is split into two halves, (KL, KR) ∈ Fm×Fm.
Let Ke ∈ Fm be the eth round key with 1 ≤ e ≤ r + 2. Then we have:
K1 = KL K2 = KR
Ke = D ·Ke−1 +Ke−2 + ve e = 3, 4, . . . , r + 2
where D is the same matrix used in the round function of the cipher and the
ve are round constants:
ve = ((ξ + 1)
e−1, (ξ + 1)e, . . . , (ξ + 1)e+m−2)
4.1.2 Description of Curry
Now we describe the cipher family Curry(n,m, r, f,D), which has an SPN
structure. In this case the cipher parameters are:
• n,m ∈ N: the plaintext space, the ciphertext space and the cipher key
space are Fm×m, where F = GF(2n), hence the block and key lengths
are equal to N = nm2 bits; moreover all internal states and round keys
of Curry cipher are represented by m×m-matrices in F;
• r ∈ N: the number of rounds;
• f : F → F: a bijective non-linear mapping giving the S-Box of the
round function;
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• D = (di,j) ∈ Fm×m: an invertible matrix used for diffusion.
The Curry round function ρ : Fm×m × Fm×m → Fm×m is composed of
four operations: the round key addition, a non-linear transformation G given
by the parallel application of m2 S-Boxes, matrix transposition, and matrix
multiplication; thus ρ is defined as:
ρ(S,K) = D ·G(S +K)T ,
where S is a m×m state matrix, K is a round key, and
G((si,j)) = (f(si,j)).
A plaintext S0 is encrypted into a ciphertext Sr by implementing the
round function ρ exactly r times followed by an additional key addition after
the last round:
Se = ρ(Se−1, Ke) e = 1, 2, . . . , r − 1
Sr = ρ(Sr−1, Kr) +Kr+1.
The inverse round function ρ−1 is given by:
ρ−1(S,K) = G−1((D−1 · S)T ) +K,
and the decryption process consists of the following sequence of iterated steps:
Sr−1 = ρ−1(Sr +Kr+1, Kr)
Se−1 = ρ−1(Se, Ke) e = r − 1, r − 2, . . . , 1
The key schedule
To derive the round keys K1, · · · , Kr+1, the Curry key schedule is applied
to a cipher key K ∈ Fm×m. The key schedule is affine over F, and consists
of the following sequence of step:
K1 = K
Ke = D ·KTe−1 + Ae 2 ≤ e ≤ r + 1
where D is the same matrix used in the round function and Ae ∈ Fm×m is a
matrix of round constants. For 2 ≤ e ≤ r + 1 and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, the element
ai,j of Ae is equal to ξ
e+(i−1)m+j.
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4.1.3 Selected Parameters
For Flurry and Curry we now specify a set of S-Box functions and lin-
ear transformations so that the ciphers with these parameters have a good
resistance against differential and linear cryptanalysis even if the number of
rounds is low. An additional condition for the parameters is that the de-
gree of Flurry and Curry equations, which will be described in the next
subsection, must be relative small.
We use matrices of Maximum Distance Separable codes – MDS matrices
for short – for the matrix D in the linear layer and the key schedule. We
chose these types of linear transformations since they have optimal diffusion
properties. This strategy is widely used in modern block cipher design; all
ciphers following the wide trail design use diffusion optimal matrices. The
matrix D4 below actually is the matrix used in the MixColumns step of AES,
D2 is equivalent to a Pseudo-Hadamard Transform over F.
The S-Box functions
The only non-linear components of Flurry and Curry are the S-Boxes.
For our purpose we have selected several suitable functions from the set{
fd : F→ F, x 7→ xd
}
.
From the point of view of linear and differential cryptanalysis, properties of
power functions over finite fields of characteristic two, as their differential
uniformity and nonlinearity, are well investigated [49, 6, 30].
Definition 4.1.1. Let f : F→ F be a mapping and
δ = max
a,b∈F
a 6=0
#{x ∈ F : f(x+ a) = f(x) + b}.
Then f is called differentially δ-uniform.
For any a =
∑n−1
i=0 aiξ
i ∈ F and b =∑n−1i=0 biξi ∈ F we set
〈a, b〉 =
n−1∑
i=0
aibi
Definition 4.1.2. The nonlinearity of a function f : F→ F is defined as
N (f) = min
a,b∈F
b6=0
#{x ∈ F : 〈x, a〉 6= 〈f(x), b〉}
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Table 4.1: S-Box mappings over F = GF(2n) with n ∈ {8, 16, 32, 64}
function bijective over F δ N (f)
f−1 : x 7→
{
x−1 if x 6= 0
0 if x = 0
yes 4 2n−1 − 2n2
f3 : x 7→ x3 no 2 ≥ 2n−1 − 2n2
f5 : x 7→ x5 no 4 ≥ 2n−1 − 2n2+1
f7 : x 7→ x7 yes ≤ 6 ≥ 2n−1 − 3 · 2n2
Consider fd with d = 3, 5, 7, and d = 2
n− 2. For the last function we will
write f−1 instead of f2n−2 and call it the inversion S-box, while f3, f5 and f7
are called monomial S-Boxes. These functions have the following differential
uniformity and nonlinearity.
Lemma 4.1.3. 1. f3 is a 2-uniform mapping
2. f−1 and f5 are 4-uniform mappings.
3. f7 has δ-uniformity of 6 or less.
Proof. Obviously for all a, b ∈ F with a 6= 0 the equation x7 + (x + a)7 = b
has at most 6 roots. For claims 1 and 2, see [49].
Lemma 4.1.4. 1. The nonlinearity of f−1 is 2n−2 − 2n2 .
2. For a polynomial function f : F → F of degree d the following holds
true: N (f) ≥ 2n−1 − bd−1
2
c2n2
Proof. For claim 1, see [30], for claim 2 see [19].
These results are summarized in Table 4.1. Note that the functions f3
and f5 are non-bijective, and hence they cannot be used as a Curry S-box.
The linear transformations
From the point of view of cryptanalysis, two important characteristic of a
linear transformation are its differential and linear branch number [28]. Let
w(X) be the hamming weight of a vector X = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Fm, i.e., the
number of non-zero coordinates of X.
Definition 4.1.5. Let M be a m ×m-matrix in F. The differential branch
number Bd(M) of M is defined as
Bd(M) = min
X∈Fm\{0}
(w(X) + w(M ·X))
while the linear branch number Bl(M) is defined as Bl(M) = Bd(MT ).
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Since for anym×m-matrixM and the column vectorX0 = (1, 0, . . . , 0)T ∈
Fm we have w(M ·X0) ≤ m, the differential and linear branch number of a
linear transformation of Fm are bounded above by m+ 1. An useful criteria
for a linear transformation to have the maximal differential branch number
is given in the following proposition [39].
Proposition 4.1.6. Let M be a non-singular m × m-matrix in F. Then
Bd(M) = m+ 1 iff any square submatrix of M is non-singular.
It follows easily from this proposition that if Bd(M) = m + 1, then
Bd(M) = Bl(M), and in this case it suffices to speak of the branch num-
ber B(M) of a matrix M .
For linear transformations of Flurry and Curry we use the following
matrices:
D1 =
(
ξ
)
D2 =
(
ξ 1
1 1
)
D4 =

ξ ξ + 1 1 1
1 ξ ξ + 1 1
1 1 ξ ξ + 1
ξ + 1 1 1 ξ

Obviously, the matrices D1 and D2 have the maximal branch number for any
F = GF(2n) with n ≥ 2, and B(D4) = 5 whenever n > 4.
Lemma 4.1.7. Let F = GF(2n) with n ≥ 5. Then B(D1) = 2, B(D2) = 3,
and B(D4) = 5.
4.1.4 Polynomial Representation of the Ciphers
In the following polynomial representations for Flurry and Curry are
given. Like in the case of AES, to describe the transformation of a plaintext
into a ciphertext here also intermediate state variables are used. We define
the state of round 0 to be the initial state and call the variables of the initial
state plaintext variables. Correspondingly the variables referring to the state
after the execution of the last round are called ciphertext variables. The set
of state variables of a cipher is denoted by X , the set of expanded key vari-
ables by K. All polynomials considered are then elements of the polynomial
ring R = F[X ∪ K].
Denote by x
(e)
i the variable referring to the ith element of the Flurry
cipher state after the eth application of the round function, and by k
(e)
i the
variable referring to the ith element of the eth round key. For SPN ciphers,
we denote the internal state variables after the eth application of the round
function by x
(e)
i,j and the expanded key variables by k
(e)
i,j . By definition, x
(0)
i is
a Flurry plaintext variable, while a plaintext variable of Curry is denoted
by x
(0)
i,j .
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• Flurry(n,m, r, f,D)
For Feistel ciphers the left half of the state in round e is identical to
the right half of the state in round e− 1, and we have the following mr
trivial linear equations:
x
(e)
j + x
(e−1)
j+m = 0
Let D = (di,j) with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. Each monomial S-Box fd of the
cipher induces a polynomial equation of degree d = deg(fd). Thus we
get a total of mr non-linear equations of form:
x
(e)
m+j + x
(e−1)
j +
m∑
l=1
dj,l ·
(
x
(e−1)
m+l + k
(e)
l
)d
= 0
with 1 ≤ e ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
In the case of the inversion S-Box f−1 such equations are of degree 2n−2.
However they can be closely approximated by quadratical equations as
follows. Let y
(e)
i be the additional variable referring to the output of
the ith S-box in the eth round. Then,
y
(e)
i ·
(
x
(e−1)
m+i + k
(e)
i
)
= 1
holds with probability 2
n−1
2n
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ e ≤ r, and
x
(e)
m+j + x
(e−1)
j +
m∑
l=1
dj,l · y(e)l = 0.
Since for the Flurry linear transformation only invertible matrices D
are selected, all additional variables y
(e)
i can be eliminated from the
system using the above linear equations. The resulting equations are
then of the following form:(
x
(e−1)
m+i + k
(e)
i
)
·
m∑
j=1
d′i,j ·
(
x
(e)
m+j + x
(e−1)
j
)
+ 1 = 0.
Since after the last application of the round function the internal state
of the cipher is added with the round key once more, the equations for
the last round are of a slightly different form. Here the linear equations
for the left half are given by
x
(r)
j + x
(r−1)
j+m + k
(r+1)
j = 0,
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while for the right half of the state we have
x
(r)
m+j + x
(r−1)
j + k
r+2
j +
m∑
l=1
dj,l ·
(
x
(r−1)
m+l + k
(r)
l
)d
= 0,
in the case of a monomial S-box, and(
x
(r−1)
m+j + k
(r)
j
)
·
m∑
l=1
d′j,l ·
(
x
(r)
m+l + x
(r−1)
l + k
r+2
l
)
+ 1 = 0,
if the S-box is inversion, where 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Also, we see that for Flurry(n,m, r, f−1, Dm) the obtained polynomial
system is correct only with probability
(
2n−1
2n
)mr
.
The linear equations for the key schedule of Flurry can be written
as:
k
(e)
j + k
(e−2)
j + (θ + 1)
et+j +
m∑
l=1
dj,lk
(e−1)
l = 0
with 2 ≤ e ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
• Curry(n,m, r, f,D)
In this case, no linear equations hold between intermediate state vari-
ables.
Let D = (di,j) with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. In the case of a monomial S-box fd
we get the following equations:
x
(e)
i,j +
m∑
l=1
di,l ·
(
x
(e−1)
j,l + k
(e)
j,l
)d
= 0
with 1 ≤ e ≤ r − 1, and
x
(r)
i,j + k
(r+1)
i,j +
m∑
l=1
di,l ·
(
x
(r−1)
j,l + k
(r)
j,l
)d
= 0
for the last round; here in all equations 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. To describe the
inversion S-box as a quadratic equation, again an additional variables
are used. Denote by y
(e)
i,j the variable in row i, column j of the state after
the eth application of the S-box layer. Then the quadratic equation for
the inversion S-box can be written as:
y
(e)
i,j ·
(
x
(e−1)
i,j + k
(e)
i,j
)
= 1
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This equation holds with probability 2
n−1
2n
. Further, the equations for
the Curry linear transformation are of form
x
(e)
i,j +
m∑
l=1
di,l · y(e)j,l = 0,
with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, 1 ≤ e ≤ r − 1, while in the last round they are
slightly different:
x
(r)
i,j + k
(r+1)
i,j +
m∑
l=1
di,l · y(r)j,l = 0.
Any linear transformation of the Curry round function is invertible,
therefore all additional variables y
(e)
i,j can be eliminated from the system
using these linear equations. In this case we obtain the following system
of quadratic equations:(
x
(e−1)
i,j + k
(e)
i,j
)
·
m∑
l=1
d′j,l ·
(
x
(e)
l,i + δek
(r+1)
i,j
)
+ 1 = 0,
where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, 1 ≤ e ≤ r, the parameter δe = 1 if e = r, and
δe = 0 otherwise. However, this polynomial system does not hold with
probability one but with probability
(
2n−1
2n
)m2r
.
The linear equations for the key schedule can be expressed as follows:
k
(e)
i,j + (θ)
e+(i−1)m+j +
m∑
l=1
di,lk
(e−1)
l,j = 0
with 2 ≤ e ≤ r + 1, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m.
Note that the field equations v2
n
+ v = 0 are not included in our polyno-
mial systems.
4.2 Resistance against Classical Attacks
In this section we determine the strength of our cipher constructions against
differential and linear cryptanalysis. Differential cryptanalysis is a chosen-
ciphertext attack due to Biham and Shamir and was the first successful attack
on the DES [7]. This type of attack exploits biases in the first order deriva-
tive of the cipher. For carefully chosen plaintexts with specific differences a
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cryptanalyst makes assumption about their propagation through the cipher
and predicts output differences in ciphertext pairs. If these predictions are
correct with sufficiently high probability they allow an attacker to determine
round key bits.
Linear cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack that was devised by Mat-
sui [46] to attack the DES. For this attack to succeed, the cryptanalyst has
to construct a probable key-independent linear approximation for individual
output bits of the cipher. By counting the number of time this linear approx-
imation agrees with the actual output of the cipher she can establish which
value for the key bit is more likely.
The notion of practical security of block ciphers against differential and
linear cryptanalysis was introduced by Knudsen [43]. The exact definition of
this notion is postponed to the end of Section 4.2.2. We will derive the num-
ber of rounds that will make our cipher practically secure against differential
and linear cryptanalysis.
Note that our objective was not to evaluate the strength of our ciphers
against all known attacks. Our ciphers may very well be vulnerable against
one or several advanced attacks even if they resist standard linear and dif-
ferential cryptanalysis. Indeed, as an example we argue that the choices we
have made for the S-Boxes are very weak against interpolation attacks.
4.2.1 Estimating the Resistance against Differential and
Linear Cryptanalysis
From the point of view of linear and differential cryptanalysis, two important
characteristics for an iterated block cipher are the linear and differential
probability of its round function.
Let ρ : GF(2)N → GF(2)N be a function for which we wish to compute
the linear and differential probability. In the following X denotes a uniformly
distributed random variable in GF(2)N .
Definition 4.2.1. The linear probability for a pair (a, b) ∈ GF(2)N×GF(2)N
with a 6= 0 is defined as
LPρ(a, b) = (2 · PrX {〈a,X〉 = 〈b, ρ(X)〉} − 1)2
Here 〈X, Y 〉 = ∑xiyi for any X = (x1, . . . , xN), Y = (y1, . . . , yN) ∈
GF(2)N . In the above definition, a is called input mask and b is called output
mask of a round. A vector of masks A = (a1, . . . , ar+1) with ai 6= 0 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ r is called linear characteristic of a cipher.
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Definition 4.2.2. The differential probability for a pair (∆x,∆y) ∈ GF(2)N×
GF(2)N with ∆x 6= 0 is defined as
DPρ(∆x,∆y) = PrX {ρ(X) + ρ(X +∆x) = ∆y}
The value ∆x is called input difference of a round, while ∆y is called
output difference. A vector of differences A = (a1, . . . , ar+1) with ai 6= 0 for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ r is called differential characteristic of a cipher.
Definition 4.2.3. Let ΩL be the set of all linear characteristics and ΩD the
set of all differential characteristics of a cipher C with a round function ρ.
The maximum linear characteristic probability (MLCP) of C is
MLCP(C) = max
A∈ΩL
r∏
i=1
LPρ(ai, ai+1)
Analogously the maximum differential characteristic probability (MDCP) of
C is
MDCP(C) = max
A∈ΩD
r∏
i=1
DPρ(ai, ai+1)
To evaluate the linear and differential probability for an arbitrary function
ρ : GF(2)N → GF(2)N can be hard, if N is large, e.g., N = 128. Fortunately,
if the round function of a cipher has a SP structure, one can estimate MLCP
and MDCP using properties of the S-boxes. Here fundamental parameters
are the maximal linear and differential probability of the S-box function as
well as the minimum number of active S-BoxesM over consecutive rounds of
the cipher. Kanda [42] gives useful results on both SPN ciphers and Feistel
ciphers with a SP round function; from these we derive the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2.4. Suppose C is either a SPN cipher or a Feistel ciphers
with a SP round function, p and q are the maximum differential and linear
probabilities of all S-box functions respectively, and M is the minimal number
of active S-Boxes. Then,
MDCP(C) ≤ pM and MLCP(C) ≤ qM .
Also, according to [42] the minimal number of active S-boxes can be
estimated as follows:
Lemma 4.2.5. The minimum number of active S-boxes in 4, 6, 8 consecutive
rounds of a Feistel cipher with SP round function is lower bounded by B(D),
B(D)+2 and 2B(D)+1 respectively. For an SPN cipher the minimum number
of active S-Boxes for 2r consecutive rounds is lower bounded by rB(D).
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Table 4.2: The maximum differential and linear probability, p(f) and q(f),
of the S-Box function f : GF(2n)→ GF(2n) and the miminum number M of
active S-Boxes for Flurry(n,m, r, f,Dm) and Curry(n,m, r, f,Dm)
S-box p(f) q(f) M Flurry Curry
f−1 22−n 22−n #rounds m = 1 2 4 m = 2 4
f3 2
1−n ≤ 22−n r = 4 2 3 5 6 10
f5 2
2−n ≤ 24−n r = 6 4 5 7 9 15
f7 ≤ 3 · 21−n ≤ 3 · 22−n r = 8 5 7 11 12 20
4.2.2 Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis of Flurry
and Curry
In this section we show how to compute upper bounds of MLCP and the
MDCP of ciphers of the Flurry and Curry family. From these bounds we
can deduce the number of rounds required to make an instance practically
secure against differential and linear cryptanalysis.
The maximum differential probability of a function f : F → F can be
calculated from δ as p(f) = δ
#F where δ is according to Definition 4.1.1. The
maximum linear probability of a mapping f : F→ F can be computed as
q(f) =
(
1− 2N (f)
#F
)2
where N (f) is defined as in Section 4.1.3. From Theorema 4.2.4 it follows
directly that for Flurry and Curry the MDCP is bounded by p(f)M while
the MLCP is bounded by q(f)M , where M is the miminum number of active
S-Boxes. A lower bound for M is given in Lemma 4.2.5. Table 4.2 contains
p(f), q(f), andM for the set of selected parameters of Flurry and Curry.
According to Knudsen [43], a block cipher with dependent round keys is
practically secure against differential and linear cryptanalysis if the MLCP
and the MDCP is too low for an attack to work under the assumption of
independent round keys. Note however that for both r-round Feistel and
r-round SPN ciphers, we need to consider the MLCP and MDCP of r − 2
rounds because of attacks that guess bits of the first and the last round key,
so-called 2R attacks.
4.2.3 Interpolation Attacks
Jakobsen and Knudsen presented interpolation attacks in [40] as a counter-
point to the growing trend of using algebraic S-Boxes such as those proposed
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by Nyberg [49]. In fact, interpolation attacks can be seen as the first alge-
braic attacks on block ciphers. The underlying intuition of this attack is that
the relationship between plaintext and ciphertext can be expressed as a tuple
of polynomial expressions. If the degree of these polynomials is low enough,
the coefficients of the polynomials can be interpolated from a number of
plaintext/ciphertext pairs. A key–dependent equivalent of the encryption or
the decryption algorithm has then been determined. In [40] upper bounds
on the number of required pairs for known-plaintext interpolation attacks for
selected examples are given. In general this number increases exponentially
with the degree of the polynomial function describing the S-Box, the number
of rounds and the number of elements in the internal state, while for the
attacks we present in the next section it remains a constant quantity.
Courtois later improved on the work of Jakobsen and Knudsen and intro-
duced an attack called General Linear Cryptanalysis [23]. In the same paper
he also gives several examples of insecure ciphers based on inversion based
S-Boxes that resist differential and linear cryptanalysis. His approach and
his goals are quite different from ours however.
Flurry and Curry quite naturally are susceptible to interpolation at-
tacks – their clean structure and the monomial S-boxes make them textbook
examples. As a matter of fact, the cipher PURE presented in the origi-
nal article is identical to the 64-bit cipher Flurry(32, 1, r, f3, I1) sans key
scheduling.
4.3 Attacks Using Gro¨bner Bases
In the following we describe Gro¨bner basis attacks on Flurry and Curry.
These attacks are based on Algorithm 3 given in section 2.3.2. Since no the-
oretical works estimating the performance of Gro¨bner basis algorithms in the
case of polynomial systems for block ciphers are currently known, we carried
out experiments to study the resistance of our ciphers against Gro¨bner basis
attacks. Results of these experiments are presented and analyzed in sec-
tion 4.3.2. Then we show how to obtain a Gro¨bner basis w.r.t. a total-degree
term order for Flurry and Curry with polynomial S-boxes by linear oper-
ations. Finally, a theoretical upper bounds for the time and space complexity
of Gro¨bner basis attacks on such ciphers are given.
4.3.1 Key Recovery Using Gro¨bner Bases
The Gro¨bner basis attacks presented here work under the assumption that
a small number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs are known. To determine the
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secret key of a cipher Algorithm 3 is used. Suppose one cipher E from the
Flurry or Curry family is fixed, K is a secret key, and Ω = {(P,EK(C))}
is a set of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs. The variable ordering should be
such that the key variables of the first round are the least elements. Then
an Gro¨bner basis attack on E works as follows:
1. Set up a polynomial system P = {pi = 0} for the cipher as described in
Section 4.1.4. The system P consists of both cipher and key schedule
equations.
2. Request a pair ((P1, . . . Pt), (C1, . . . , Ct)) ∈ Ω. This gives rise to the
following additional system of linear equations G = {gi = 0}:
x
(0)
1 + P1 = 0 x
(r)
1 + C1 = 0
...
...
x
(0)
t + Pt = 0 x
(r)
t + Ct = 0
where x
(0)
1 , . . . , x
(0)
t are the plaintext variables, and x
(r)
1 , . . . , x
(r)
t are the
ciphertext variables. For Flurry t = 2 ·m, and for Curry t = m2.
Put S = P ∪ G.
3. Solve the system S in F using Algorithm 3. Since for a cipher with the
inversion S-box the polynomial system does not hold with probability
one, it is possible that in this case the result is VS = ∅.
4. If VS = ∅ go to Step 2, otherwise proceed.
5. Try all elements k ∈ VS as key candidates using other known pairs. If
k does not encrypt P ′ to C ′ for some (P ′, C ′) ∈ Ω, remove k from VS,
otherwise retain.
6. If VS contains more than one element, it is necessary to obtain addi-
tional plaintext/ciphertext pairs and repeat the previous step.
7. Terminate
For the system S of equations induced by Flurry and Curry with
monomial S-boxes and any pair (P,EK(P )), we always have K ∈ VS. In the
case the inversion S-box is used, the probability that K 6∈ VS is approximated
by
1−
(
2n − 1
2n
)q
≈ 1− e−q/2n ,
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where q = mr for the Flurry(n,m, r, f−1, Dm), and q = m2r for the
Curry(n,m, r, f−1, Dm). If q  2n, this probability is close to 0.
Further, the number of solutions of S in F is equivalent to the number
of distinct keys encrypting P to C. The probability that #VS = 1 can be
estimated as (
1− 1
2N
)2N−1
≈ 1
e
,
where N is the bit length of a ciphertext and a secret key. Our experimental
results confirm this estimation. Thus in about 36.8% of all cases, only one
known plaintext/ciphertext pair is needed to recover the full secret key. In
almost all other cases, the secret key can be determined, if a second pair is
known. Indeed, the probability that there exists K ′ 6= K such that EK(P ) =
EK′(P ) and EK(P
′) = EK′(P ′) for random P, P ′ 6= P is approximately equal
to
1−
(
1− 1
2N · (2N − 1)
)2N−1
≈ 1− e−1/2N .
Let I be the ideal generated by the set of polynomials L = (⋃i{pi}) ∪
(
⋃
i{gi}). We call this ideal the key recovery ideal. Algorithm 3 used in step
3 consists of DRL Gro¨bner basis computation, Gro¨bner basis conversion and
computing zeroes of univariate polynomials over F. Since in our case
2n  max{deg(f) : f ∈ L} =
{
d, if E uses fd as S-box,
2, if E uses f−1 as S-box,
the field equations are not added to S. Instead of this, by solving of univariate
polynomials only zeroes in F are selected. By Theorem 2.2.4 the run time of
the FGLM algorithm for Gro¨bner basis conversion depends on dimF(R/I).
In our case we have
dimF(R/I) ≥ VS,
and in general we can expect VS to have a lot more elements than VS. The
best algorithm for factoring univariate polynomials is due to Kaltofen and
Shoup [41] and has a complexity of O(d1.815p n) field operations, where dp is
the degree of the polynomial. This degree is bounded above by
min(2n − 1, dimF(R/I)).
4.3.2 Experimental Results
We have performed experiments to analyze the resistance of Flurry and
Curry using the computer algebra system Magma [53], version 2.11-8, on
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an AMD Athlon 64 3200+ equipped with 1024 Megabytes of RAM running
Linux. Magma implements Fauge´re’s F4 algorithm [31] and is widely consid-
ered the best publicly available tool for computing Gro¨bner bases. We have
chosen n and m such that the ciphers evaluated are 128-bit block ciphers.
Table 4.3 lists a number of instantiations of Flurry and Curry ciphers
for which we were able to successfully recover the secret key; the 6, 8 and 10
round Flurry ciphers are resistant to linear and differential cryptanalysis.
We see that ciphers with inversion-based S-boxes are easier to break than
ciphers which use a monomial S-box, even if the monomial is of very low
degree. Furthermore we were unable to determine an a priori indicator for
selecting the most efficient Gro¨bner basis conversion algorithm – in some
cases FGLM was faster, in other cases the Gro¨bner walk; the same holds for
the memory consumption.
4.3.3 Gro¨bner Bases without Polynomial Reductions
By solving a system of polynomial equations using Algorithm 3 the first step
is to compute a DRL Gro¨bner basis of this system. In this section we show
that for the key recovery ideal of Flurry andCurry with monomial S-boxes
a DRL Gro¨bner basis w.r.t. a suitable term order can be obtained by applying
linear operations only. To make this linear transformation easier to describe
we use a vectorial representation for Flurry and a matrix representation
for Curry.
First we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.1. Let R = F[x1, . . . , xn] be a polynomial ring with a term order.
Suppose G = {g1, . . . , gn} is a set of polynomials such that HT(gi) = xdii
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and some di ≥ 1. Then G is a Gro¨bner basis, and
dimF(R/〈G〉) =
∏n
i=1 di.
Proof. Obviously, all head terms of G are pairwise coprime. By Theo-
rem 2.2.3, G is a Gro¨bner basis. According to Theorem 2.2.5,
dim(R/〈G〉) = # {t ∈ T : HT(g) - t for all g ∈ G} .
For any t = xe11 . . . x
en
n ∈ T and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have HT(gi) - t iff ei < di.
Thus we get
dim(R/〈G〉) = # {xe11 . . . xenn ∈ T : ei < di for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n} =
n∏
i=1
di.
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Table 4.3: Gro¨bner basis attacks on Flurry and Curry: Experimental
results obtained with Magma
cipher conversion CPU time memory used
Flurry(64, 1, 4, f−1, I1) Walk 0.011 s 3.48 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 4, f−1, I1) FGLM 0.011 s 3.48 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 4, f3, I1) Walk 0.04 s 3.48 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 4, f3, I1) FGLM 0.029 s 3.58 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 4, f5, I1) Walk 1.28 s 3.97 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 4, f5, I1) FGLM 2.3 s 6.36 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 4, f7, I1) Walk 13.61 s 6.22 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 4, f7, I1) FGLM 82.62 s 33.4 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 6, f−1, I1) Walk 0.15 s 3.58 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 6, f−1, I1) FGLM 0.059 s 3.58 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 6, f3, I1) Walk 59.91 s 10.63 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 6, f3, I1) FGLM 145.08 s 193.24 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 8, f−1, I1) Walk 3.43 s 4.51 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 8, f−1, I1) FGLM 1.46 s 4.46 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 10, f−1, I1) Walk 115.44 s 14.74 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 10, f−1, I1) FGLM 60.61 s 12.39 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 12, f−1, I1) Walk 4194.28 s 99.97 MBytes
Flurry(64, 1, 12, f−1, I1) FGLM 2064 s 142.90 MBytes
Flurry(32, 2, 4, f−1, D2) Walk 216.53 s 25.58 MBytes
Flurry(32, 2, 4, f−1, D2) FGLM 65.78 s 41.62 MBytes
Flurry(16, 4, 2, f−1, D4) Walk 264 s 37.13 MBytes
Flurry(16, 4, 2, f−1, D4) FGLM 26.119 s 18.56 MBytes
Curry(32, 2, 3, f−1, D2) Walk 1750.87 sec 138.77 MBytes
Curry(32, 2, 3, f−1, D2) FGLM 3676.26 sec 107.54 MBytes
The key idea of our method is to construct polynomial sets that describe
the key recovery problem for Flurry and Curry and satisfy the condition
of the previous lemma.
• Curry(n,m, r, fd, D)
In this case, S in the matrix form is given by(
x
(e)
i,j
)
+D ·
((
x
(e−1)
i,j + k
(e)
i,j
)d)T
= 0;
(
x
(0)
i,j + pi,j
)
= 0;(
k
(e+1)
i,j
)
+D ·
(
k
(e)
i,j
)T
+
(
ξe+(i−1)m+j+1
)
= 0;
(
x
(r)
i,j + k
(r+1)
i,j + ci,j
)
= 0;
with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, 1 ≤ e ≤ r, and a known plaintext/ciphertext pair
P = (pi,j), C = (ci,j) ∈ Fm×m. We see that for any arbitrary total
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degree term order the head terms of all polynomials in this system
are univariate. Indeed, for each polynomial of the eth round of the
encryption, either a power of a state variable of the preceding round
or a power of a key variable of the current round occur as head term,
while all non-constant terms of linear equations are univariate. Some
head terms however occur more than once. Multiplying the matrices
of all rounds of the encryption by D−1, we obtain
D−1 ·
(
x
(e)
i,j
)
+
((
x
(e−1)
i,j + k
(e)
i,j
)d)T
= 0;
(
x
(0)
i,j + pi,j
)
= 0;(
k
(e+1)
i,j
)
+D ·
(
k
(e)
i,j
)T
+
(
ξe+(i−1)m+j+1
)
= 0;
(
x
(r)
i,j + k
(r+1)
i,j + ci,j
)
= 0.
Denote the set of polynomials of this system by G. Let  be the
DRL term order defined on the set of variables as follows. Put Xe =
{x(e)i,j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m} and Ke = {k(e)i,j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m} for all e. Then,
X0 ≺ K0 ≺ K1 ≺ · · · ≺ Kr+1 ≺ X1 ≺ X2 ≺ · · · ≺ Xr,
where M1 ≺ M2 with M1,M2 ⊂ T means t1 ≺ t2 for all t1 ∈ M1
and t2 ∈ M2; and for all e, set x(e)i1,j1 ≺ x(e)i2,j2 and k(e)i1,j1 ≺ k(e)i2,j2 iff
(i1 − 1)m+ j1 < (i2 − 1)m+ j2, i.e.,
x
(e)
1,1 ≺ · · · ≺ x(e)1,m ≺ x(e)2,1 ≺ · · · ≺ x(e)m,m;
k
(e)
1,1 ≺ · · · ≺ k(e)1,m ≺ k(e)2,1 ≺ · · · ≺ k(e)m,m.
It can easily be checked that all head terms of G w.r.t. this term order
are pairwise coprime. Actually,
HT(G) =
{
x
(0)
i,j , x
(r)
i,j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m
}⋃
⋃{(
k
(0)
i,j
)d
,
(
x
(e)
i,j
)d
: 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, 1 ≤ e ≤ r − 1
}⋃
⋃{
k
(e)
i,j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, 1 ≤ e ≤ r
}
,
and no two polynomials of G have an identical head terms. Thus, by
Lemma 4.3.1, we have constructed a Gro¨bner basis.
• Flurry(n,m, r, f,D)
In this case the first step is the same as above. After multiplying the
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vectors of all rounds of the encryption by D−1, we have
X0,L + PL = 0; X0,R + PR = 0;
Xr,L + CL = 0; Xr,R + CR = 0;
D−1 ·
 x(e)m+1 + x(e−1)1. . .
x
(e)
2m + x
(e−1)
m
+

(
x
(e−1)
m+1 + k
(e)
1
)d
. . .(
x
(e−1)
2m + k
(e)
m
)d
 = 0
Xe,L +Xe−1,R = 0; Ke+2 +D ·Ke+1 +Ke+2 + V = 0;
where Xj,L =
(
x
(j)
1 , . . . , x
(j)
m
)T
, Xj,R =
(
x
(j)
m+1, . . . , x
(j)
2m
)T
with 0 ≤
j ≤ r, K1, . . . , Kr+2 are the round key variables in the vector form, and
P = (PL, PR), C = (CL, CR) ∈ F2·m is a known plaintext/ciphertext
pair. Since an additional key addition is performed on both halves
of the final state of the cipher, equations of the two last rounds look
slightly different:
D−1 ·
 x(r−1)m+1 + x(r−2)1 + k(r+1)1. . .
x
(r−1)
2m + x
(r−2)
m + k
(r+1)
1
+

(
x
(r−2)
m+1 + k
(r−1)
1
)d
. . .(
x
(r−2)
2m + k
(r−1)
m
)d
 = 0,
D−1 ·
 x(r)m+1 + x(r−1)1 + k(r+2)1. . .
x
(r)
2m + x
(r−1)
m + k
(r+2)
1
+

(
x
(r−1)
m+1 + k
(r)
1
)d
. . .(
x
(r−1)
2m + k
(r)
m
)d
 = 0,
Xr−1,L +Xr−2,R = 0, Xr,L +Xr−1,R = 0.
Let  be the DRL term order defined on the set of variables as follows:
X0,L ≺ X0,R ≺ Xr,L ≺ Xr,R ≺ Xr−1,R ≺ K0 ≺ Kr ≺
K1 ≺ · · · ≺ Kr−1 ≺ Kr+1 ≺ Kr+2 ≺ X1,L ≺ · · · ≺ Xr−1,R,
where
Xe,L = {x(e)i : 1 ≤ i ≤ m},
Xe,R = {x(e)i+m : 1 ≤ i ≤ m},
Ke = {k(e)i : 1 ≤ i ≤ m}.
Also, set x
(e)
i ≺ x(e)j and k(e)i ≺ k(e)j iff i < j for all e, i.e.,
x
(e)
1 ≺ · · · ≺ x(e)m ≺ x(e)m+1 ≺ · · · ≺ x(e)2m and k(e)1 ≺ · · · ≺ k(e)m .
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However, not all head terms of the above system now are pairwise co-
prime. Indeed, the nonlinear polynomials of the first and the last round
have powers of key variables as head terms. These key variables are of
the first and the last round respectively. For the first round this poses
no problem. But for the last round the key schedule polynomials that
produce the last round key have the same head terms. To obtain pair-
wise coprime head terms within each and across rounds, we therefore
need to rewrite the key schedule equations. First, we express all round
keys as a linear combination of the first two round keys. Let M1 = I
be the m ×m identity matrix, M2 = D, and V3 = v3. For all e ≥ 3,
put Me = D ·Me−1 +Me−2 and Ve+1 = D · Ve + ve. Then we have
Ke =Me−1 ·K2 +Me−2 ·K1 + Ve
with 3 ≤ e ≤ r+2. Further, we write the second round key as a linear
combination of the first and the last round key.
K2 =M
−1
r−1 · (Kr +Mr−2 ·K1 + Vr) .
This results in all head terms being pairwise prime. We see that this
work if Mr−1 is invertible. We have checked by direct calculation that,
this condition holds for D1 and D2 selected in Section 4.1.3 in all cases
with r ≤ 20, and for D4, whenever r ∈ {3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, . . . }.
Denote the set of polynomials of the obtained system with the modified
key schedule equations by G. By Lemma 4.3.1, G is a Gro¨bner basis.
Moreover, HT(G) = T1 ∪ Td with
T1 = X0,L ∪ X0,R ∪ Xr,L ∪ Xr,R ∪ Xr−1,R ∪ Kr+1 ∪ Kr+2 ∪r−1i=1 (Ki ∪ Xi,L),
Td =
{
td : t ∈ K0 ∪ Kr ∪r−2e=2 Xe,R
}
.
We have shown how to obtain DRL Gro¨bner bases for a large subset of
Flurry and Curry. For the described method, the S-box of a cipher does
not need be monomial. Actually, the method works whenever the S-box is
represented as a polynomial in the input variable. Furthermore, in this case
dimF(R/I) can be easily computed, where I is the key recovery ideal for the
cipher.
Proposition 4.3.2. Let I be the key recovery ideal of an instantiation of
either a Flurry or a Curry with a polynomial S-box given by f ∈ F[x], G
the polynomial set constructed for I as described above, and  the selected
term order. Then, G is a Gro¨bner basis of I, and the following holds:
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Table 4.4: Upper bounds on the complexity of breaking 128-bit Flurry and
Curry ciphers with FGLM
cipher n dim(R/I) # of operations
memory
required
(bytes)
Flurry(32, 2, 4, f3, D2) 8 3
8 ≈ 212.68 241.0 230.4
Flurry(32, 2, 4, f5, D2) 8 5
8 ≈ 218.58 258.7 242.2
Flurry(32, 2, 4, f7, D2) 8 7
8 ≈ 222.46 270.4 249.9
Flurry(32, 2, 6, f3, D2) 12 3
12 ≈ 219.02 260.6 243.2
Flurry(32, 2, 6, f5, D2) 12 5
12 ≈ 227.86 287.2 261.3
Flurry(32, 2, 6, f7, D2) 12 7
12 ≈ 233.69 2104.7 273.0
Flurry(32, 2, 8, f3, D2) 16 3
16 ≈ 225.36 280.0 256.7
Flurry(32, 2, 8, f5, D2) 16 5
16 ≈ 237.15 2115.5 280.3
Flurry(32, 2, 8, f7, D2) 16 7
16 ≈ 244.92 2138.8 295.8
Flurry(16, 4, 4, f3, D2) 16 3
16 ≈ 225.36 280.0 255.7
Flurry(16, 4, 4, f5, D2) 16 5
16 ≈ 237.15 2115.5 279.3
Flurry(16, 4, 4, f7, D2) 16 7
16 ≈ 244.92 2138.8 294.8
Curry(32, 2, 3, f7, D2) 12 7
12 ≈ 233.69 2104.6 273.0
1. dimF(R/I) = deg(f)
mr for Flurry(n,m, r, f,D).
2. dimF(R/I) = deg(f)
rm2 for Curry(n,m, r, f,D).
It is clear that there is no need to make all computation every time, and
G can be directly written for I. Thus we have reduced the key recovery
problem for Flurry and Curry with polynomial S-boxes to a Gro¨bner
basis conversion problem. Moreover, by Theorem 2.2.4 the complexity of
the FGLM algorithm hinges on the number of variables and dimF(R/I).
Both of these parameters are known in our case. Therefore, we can estimate
the maximum resistance of Flurry and Curry ciphers with polynomial
S-Boxes against Gro¨bner basis attacks (see Table 4.4). We conjecture the
constant factor in the estimate given in Theorem 2.2.4 to be approximately
one cipher operation. Note that for the Curry cipher we need to use a
bijective S-Box in the round function; the lowest degree S-Box function that
is bijective is f7.
The method described here does not work however for Flurry and
Curry instances with inversion S-Boxes, as the head terms in these cases
are never univariate. One example of a Gro¨bner basis for Flurry using f3
as S-box is given in Appendix B.
Chapter 5
A zero-dimensional Gro¨bner
basis for AES–128
In the previous chapter it was shown that for some ciphers a DRL zero-
dimensional Gro¨bner basis can be calculated by hand. This reduces the
key recovery problem for these block ciphers to a Gro¨bner basis conversion.
In this chapter we apply the similar method to AES-128. First using a
polynomial representation of the AES S-box over F = GF(28) we show how
a DRL zero-dimensional Gro¨bner basis can be derived in this case. Then we
study the cryptanalytic significance of this Gro¨bner basis.
5.1 Construction of the DRL Gro¨bner basis
First let us remember the basic idea of the method used in the previous
chapter to derive a DRL Gro¨bner basis without polynomial reduction. Let
the S-box of a cipher be given by some polynomial in the input, then the
head term of this polynomial w.r.t. any total degree term order is a power
of the input variable. Since all inputs of the S-boxes are different, the head
terms of the corresponding polynomials are pairwise prime. However by the
linear transformation of the cipher this polynomials are mixed. If inverting
the linear transformation we obtain polynomials with pairwise prime head
terms, then by Theorem 2.2.3 the set of this polynomials is a Gro¨bner basis.
Now let us consider AES-128. For our method we cannot use the alge-
braic representations in the form of a system of quadratic equations, since
in this case the head terms of the non-linear polynomials are not univariate,
and hence not pairwise prime. Thus we will construct a DRL Gro¨bner basis
for AES using the polynomial representation given in Section 3.2.1.
The first step of the construction is the following. In order to have poly-
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nomials with pairwise prime head terms within all rounds of encryption, we
rewrite system (3.3) of equations for the ith round (1 ≤ i ≤ 9) using the
inverse matrix D−1:
D−1 ·

xi,0 + ki,0 xi,4 + ki,4 xi,8 + ki,8 xi,12 + ki,12
xi,1 + ki,1 xi,5 + ki,5 xi,9 + ki,9 xi,13 + ki,13
xi,2 + ki,2 xi,6 + ki,6 xi,10 + ki,10 xi,14 + ki,14
xi,3 + ki,3 xi,7 + ki,7 xi,11 + ki,11 xi,15 + ki,15
+
+

S(xi−1,0) S(xi−1,4) S(xi−1,8) S(xi−1,12)
S(xi−1,5) S(xi−1,9) S(xi−1,13) S(xi−1,1)
S(xi−1,10) S(xi−1,14) S(xi−1,2) S(xi−1,6)
S(xi−1,15) S(xi−1,3) S(xi−1,7) S(xi−1,11)
 = 0,
In the last round the MixColumns transformation is omitted, and each
equation has the terms of one S-box polynomial:
S(x9,0) + x10,0 + k10,0 = 0
S(x9,1) + x10,9 + k10,9 = 0
. . .
S(x9,15) + x10,4 + k10,4 = 0
It is easy to see that for the polynomials of these systems the set of the
head terms w.r.t. any total degree term order is
{x254i,j : 0 ≤ i ≤ 9, 0 ≤ j ≤ 15},
and no two polynomial have the same head term.
Further, in the polynomial of a ciphertext equation
x10,j + cj = 0
with 0 ≤ j ≤ 15 the head term is x10,j, and it has no common non-trivial
divisor with any other head term. The terms x0,j and k0,j of a plaintext
polynomial
x0,j + k0,j + pj
have the same degree. We choose a term order such that x0,j < k0,j for any
j = 0, 15.
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Finally let us consider the key schedule equations:
ki,0
ki,1
ki,2
ki,3
ki,4
...
ki,15

=

ki−1,0 + S(ki−1,13) +ξi−1
ki−1,1 + S(ki−1,14)
ki−1,2 + S(ki−1,15)
ki−1,3 + S(ki−1,12)
ki−1,4 + ki,0
...
ki−1,15 + ki,11

(5.1)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ 10. We see that the condition all head terms are pairwise
prime does not hold any more. For example, the head term of the polynomial
S(k0,13) + k1,0 + k0,0 + 01 is k
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0,13, and it is divisible by the head term of
x0,13 + k0,13 + p13. Using the polynomial S
′ for the inverse S-box we rewrite
the key schedule equations as:
S ′(k0,j + k0,j−1 + ξj−1)
S ′(k1,j + k1,j−1)
S ′(k2,j + k2,j−1)
S ′(k3,j + k3,j−1)
k4,j + k4,j−1
...
k15,j + k15,j−1

+

k13,j−1
k14,j−1
k15,j−1
k12,j−1
k0,j
...
k11,j

= 0 (5.2)
If the fixed term order is such that
ki,15 > ki,14 > · · · > ki,0 > ki−1,15 > · · · > ki−1,1 > ki−1,0
with 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, then the set of the head terms for the key schedule polyno-
mials is
{k254i,j , ki,h : 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, 0 ≤ j ≤ 3, and 4 ≤ h ≤ 15}.
Thus by using an appropriate term order the polynomials of the modified
system for AES have pairwise prime head terms. For example, the DRL
term order with the following order of the variables satisfies this condition:
x0,0 <. . .< x0,15︸ ︷︷ ︸
plaintext variables
<k0,0 <. . .< k0,15︸ ︷︷ ︸
initial key variables
<
k1,0 <. . .< k1,15︸ ︷︷ ︸
first round key variables
< · · · < k10,0 <. . .< k10,15︸ ︷︷ ︸
last round key variables
<
x1,0 <. . .< x1,15︸ ︷︷ ︸
first round internal state variables
< · · · < x9,0 <. . .< x9,15︸ ︷︷ ︸
9th round internal state variables
<
x10,0 <. . .< x10,15︸ ︷︷ ︸
ciphertext variables
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Denote the set of the obtained polynomials byA, and this DRL term order by
<A. Then by Theorem 2.2.3, A is a Gro¨bner basis relative to <A. Moreover,
we see that A fulfill the condition of Theorem 2.3.2, and hence the ideal 〈A〉
is zero-dimensional.
5.2 Exploiting the Gro¨bner basis
In this section we study the cryptanalytic significance of the Gro¨bner basis
A constructed above. First we estimate the complexity of a conversion of A
to a Lex Gro¨bner basis using the FGLM algorithm, then we find an invariant
under the elimination of variables and explain why A cannot be used to guess
parts of the round key.
5.2.1 Complexity of Gro¨bner basis Conversions
According to Theorem 2.2.4 the complexity of a conversion of A to a Lex
Gro¨bner basis using the FGLM algorithm depends on the number of variables
and the dimension of the F-vector space R/〈A〉.
The set A consists of 200 polynomials with degree 254 and 152 linear
polynomials in 352 variables, xi,j, ki,j with 0 ≤ i ≤ 10 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 15. Let
R = F[V ], where V = {xi,j, ki,j : 0 ≤ i ≤ 10, 0 ≤ j ≤ 15}. By Lemma 4.3.1
the vector space dimension of R/〈A〉 is:
dim(R/〈A〉) = 254200 ≈ 21598.
This number is very huge. Though in Theorem 2.2.4 an upper bound of the
run time is given, there is no reason to expect that the FGLM algorithm is
efficient in this case.
The number of variables can be reduced by elimination. However the
vector space dimension of the ideal is invariant under the elimination of all
variables except the last round key variables. To prove this we need the
following proposition:
Proposition 5.2.1. Let I′ be a zero-dimensional ideal of R′ = K[x1, . . . , xn],
I an ideal of R = R[xn+1] and I
′ = I ∩ R′. Then dimR/I = dimR′/I′ iff
there exists a polynomial g ∈ R′ such that xn+1 + g ∈ I.
Proof. The vector space dimension of an ideal does not depend on a term
ordering. Let us fix a lexicographical term ordering such that xn+1 is the
greatest variable. Let RT(I) and RT(I′) be defined as follows:
RT(I) = {t ∈ T (R) : s - t for all s ∈ HT(I)}
RT(I′) = {t ∈ T (R′) : s - t for all s ∈ HT(I′)} ⊂ RT(I)
57
By Proposition 6.51 of [5], dimR/I = #RT(I). Thus it is sufficient to prove
that #RT(I) = #RT(I′). Since xn+1 - t for any t ∈ T (R′), the equality
RT(I) = RT(I′) holds iff xn+1 ∈ HT(I), i.e., there exists a polynomial
g ∈ R′ such that xn+1 + g ∈ I.
Corollary 5.2.2. Let R′ = F[k0,10, . . . , k15,10], and 〈A′〉 = 〈A〉 ∩R′. Then
dimR′/〈A′〉 = dimR/〈A〉 = 254200.
Proof. By induction using Proposition 5.2.1.
So even eliminating all variables but the cipher key variables does not re-
duce the complexity of converting the Gro¨bner basis to a term order suitable
for key recovery.
5.2.2 Ideal Membership Problem and Testing Keys
Reduction modulo a Gro¨bner basis is a simple way to verify the ideal member-
ship of a polynomial (see Section 2.3.1). Since 〈A〉 is a zero-dimensional ideal,
it contains univariate polynomials for all key byte variables. These polyno-
mials can be easily distinguish from others using the constructed Gro¨bner
basis. Moreover, each of them obviously has a zero at µi ∈ F, where µi is
the correct value of the corresponding key byte. However, the polynomial is
more difficult than
ki + µi,
and it cannot be easily guessed. Indeed, the constructed polynomial system
has solutions over the closure of the ground field, which means that we have
to test for a polynomial p = q · ∏j(ki + Cj)tj , where all Cj ∈ F are key
byte candidates and q is product of polynomials that are irreducible over F.
In additional, the degree of p can be as large as dim(R/〈A〉). We see that
the dimension of R/〈A〉 again plays an important role here: it equals the
number of solutions over the closure of the ground field. As it was shown in
the previous section, this number is obscenely large.
To eliminate all points of the variety that do not lie in F, one can adjoin
the set
F = {v256 + v : for all variables v ∈ R}
of all polynomials from the field equations to A. Unfortunately, in this
case we do not have a Gro¨bner basis anymore. What we have to do here
is to compute the intersection of two varieties; this is usually achieved by
computing the Gro¨bner basis of the sum of the corresponding ideals. We
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have a Gro¨bner basis A describing AES and a second set of polynomials F ,
which obviously forms a Gro¨bner basis relative to the same term order <A
too. It is however unclear how to exploit the Gro¨bner basis property of the
input.
Finally, note that the results given in this chapter was first published in
2006 [16], but at the time of writing this thesis, a security implications of the
above Gro¨bner basis for AES keeps to be unknown.
Chapter 6
Block Ciphers and
Semi-Regular Sequences
In this chapter we analyze the semi-regularity of several polynomial repre-
sentations for block ciphers. First we prove that the systems of equations
for the Flurry and Curry ciphers with a polynomial S-box described in
Chapter 4 as well as the Gro¨bner basis for the AES derived in Chapter 5 are
semi-regular. Then we show that polynomial systems that are similar to the
BES quadratic equations are not semi-regular. Finally we demonstrate that
systems of equations over GF(2) for iterated block ciphers, for example the
AES systems over GF(2), are not semi-regular over GF(2).
6.1 The Case of DRL Gro¨bner bases
Let us consider the DRL zero-dimensional Gro¨bner basis A for the AES
described in Chapter 5. It has the following two properties. The number of
polynomials is equal to the number of variables, and the head terms of these
polynomials are pairwise prime and univariate. For polynomial systems with
these properties we now prove the following statement:
Proposition 6.1.1. Let R = F[x1, . . . , xn] be a polynomial ring over F.
Suppose G = {g1, . . . , gn} ⊂ R is a set of polynomials such that HT(gi) = xdii
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n; then G is semi-regular.
Proof. Let g˜i = DF (gi) be the degree form of gi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then for
all i we have HT(g˜i) = HT(gi) = x
di
i . Let us show that the Hilbert series of
the sequence G˜ = (g˜1, . . . , g˜n) is[∏n
i=1(1− zdi)
(1− z)n
]
=
n∏
i=1
(
1 + z + · · ·+ zdi−1) .
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Since the head terms of all polynomials are pairwise prime, {g˜1, . . . , g˜n}
is a Gro¨bner basis, i.e., 〈HT(g˜1), . . . ,HT(g˜n)〉 = HT(〈G˜〉). Thus
E
(〈G˜〉) = T \ HT(〈G˜〉) = { n∏
i=1
xaii : for all 0 ≤ ai < di
}
.
Consider the polynomial h =
∏n
i=1
(
1 + Yi + · · ·+ Y di−1i
) ∈ Q[Y1, . . . , Yn].
Obviously, all coefficients of h is equal to 1, and
T (h) =
{ n∏
i=1
Y aii : for all 0 ≤ ai < di
}
.
Therefore, we have #Td(h) = #Ed(〈G˜〉) for all d ≥ 0. It is easy to see that
if we replace all Yi by a new variable z in h, then for any d the coefficient at
zd of the polynomial h¯(z) = h(z, . . . , z) ∈ Q[z] is equal to the number of all
terms of h which degree is d, i.e.,
h¯(z) =
∑
d≥0
#Td(h)z
d =
∑
d≥0
#Ed
(〈G˜〉)zd
Thus h¯ is the Hilbert series of G˜, and by Theorem 2.4.2, G˜ and G are semi-
regular.
Corollary 6.1.2. The DRL Gro¨bner basis A for the AES is semi-regular.
Corollary 6.1.3. The systems of equations described in Section 4.1.4 for the
Flurry and Curry ciphers with a polynomial fd as S-box are semi-regular.
Proof. The polynomials of any such system can be converted into a Gro¨bner
basis, which satisfies the conditions of Proposition 6.1.1. Moreover, we see
that both the initial set and the Gro¨bner basis have a same number of linear
polynomials as well as polynomials of degree d. Since in Theorem 2.4.2 the
form of the Hilbert series depends on the number of polynomials and their
degree but not on the head terms, the initial set passes the criterion of semi-
regularity.
The set G in Proposition 6.1.1 is semi-regular, and it can be checked using
only the first Buchberger criterion without polynomial reductions that G is
a Gro¨bner basis. Therefore a lower bound for computing Gro¨bner bases of a
semi-regular sequence is found.
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6.2 The Case of BES Equations
Now we consider systems of quadratic equations for Flurry and Curry
with the S-box f−1 (Section 4.1.4) as well as BES equations (Section 3.2.3).
These systems have the following common property. The degree form of any
quadratic polynomial has the form X · Y , where X is a linear combination
of input variables and Y is a linear combination of output variables for some
round. In order to show that these systems are not semi-regular, we first
prove the following more general proposition:
Proposition 6.2.1. Let R = F[x1, . . . , xn] be a polynomial ring over F, and
G = {g1, . . . , gm} ⊂ R be a set of polynomials, where m ≥ n. Suppose
that for some k no polynomial gi ∈ G has the term xdeg(gi)k ; then G is not
semi-regular.
Proof. Let g˜i = DF (gi) be the degree form of gi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Prove
that the ideal 〈G˜〉 = 〈g˜1, . . . , g˜m〉 is not zero-dimensional. By assumption we
have T (G˜) ∩ {xdk : d ≥ 0} = ∅. Therefore,
HT
(〈G˜〉) ⊂ {tT (G˜) : t ∈ T } ⊂ T \ {xdk : d ≥ 0} ,
i.e. there is no polynomial f ∈ 〈G˜〉 such that HT(f) = xdk for any d ≥ 0.
From Theorem 2.3.2 it follows that dim(〈G˜〉) > 0. By Corollary 2.4.4, G˜ is
not semi-regular, and so is G.
We see that the investigated systems do not satisfy the conditions of this
proposition. Indeed, in all cases any variable of the corresponding polynomial
ring occurs in some linear polynomial. However these cases can be reduced
to Proposition 6.2.1 by applying the following statement:
Proposition 6.2.2. Let R = F[x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym] and R′ = F[x1, . . . , xn]
be two polynomial rings over F. Suppose
G = {yi + gi(x1, . . . , xn), fj(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)} ⊂ R
with 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ l, and deg(gi) = 1. In addition, put G′ =
{f ′1, . . . , f ′l}, where f ′j(x1, . . . , xn) = fj(x1, . . . , xn, g1, . . . , gm). Then we have
if G is semi-regular in R, so is G′ in R′.
Proof. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ l, by g˜i and f˜j denote the degree form of gi
and fi respectively, and by I denote the ideal 〈y1+g˜1, . . . , ym+g˜m, f˜1, . . . , f˜l〉.
It is obvious that f˜j (x1, . . . , xn, g˜1, . . . , g˜m) equals either DF (f
′
j) or 0.
From the second case it follows easily that f˜j ∈ 〈y1+ g˜1, . . . , ym+ g˜m〉, and G
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is not semi-regular. Therefore, we have f˜j(x1, . . . , xn, g˜1, . . . , g˜m) = DF (f
′
j)
for all possible j.
Let T and T ′ be the set of terms in R and R′ respectively. Take a total
degree term order  on T such that yi  xj for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Let
F be a Gro¨bner basis of I′ = 〈DF (f ′1), . . . , DF (f ′l )〉 w.r.t the restriction of
 to T ′, then (⋃ {yi + g˜i})⋃F is a Gro¨bner basis of I w.r.t . Therefore,
HT(I) = HT(I′)
⋃
{yit : 1 ≤ i ≤ m, t ∈ T }
and we have
Ed(I) = Td \ HTd(I) = Ed(I′) = T ′d \ HTd(I′),
i.e., the Hilbert series hR(I) of I ⊂ R is equal to the Hilbert series hR′(I′) of
I′ ⊂ R′. Thus, we get
hR′(I
′) = hR(I) =
[∏m
i=1(1− z)
∏l
i=1(1− zdi)
(1− z)m+n
]
=
[∏l
i=1(1− zdi)
(1− z)n
]
,
where di = deg(f˜i) = deg(DF (f
′
i)). By Theorem 2.4.2, G
′ is semi-regular.
Corollary 6.2.3. The BES system SB is not semi-regular.
Proof. As stated in Section 3.2.3, SB consists of (B) and (B′). If we eliminate
the variables x
(e)
i,j and w
(e)
9,j in (B) using the linear equations, we obtain the
following system:
w
(e)
0,j
(
k
(e)
0,j + p
(e)
j
)
+ 1 = 0
w
(e)
i+1,j
(∑
αs,tw
(t)
i,s + k
(e)
i,j
)
+ 1 = 0(∑
α′q,r
(
k
(r)
10,q + c
(r)
q
))(∑
αs,tw
(t)
9,s + k
(e)
9,j
)
+ 1 = 0

i = 0, . . . , 8
j = 0, . . . , 15
e = 0, . . . , 7
The polynomials of this system and the system (B′) obviously satisfy the
conditions of Proposition 6.2.1 in the new polynomial ring
R′B = F
[
w
(e)
i,j , k
(e)
i,j , k
(e)
10,j
]
with 0 ≤ i ≤ 9, 0 ≤ j ≤ 15, and 0 ≤ e ≤ 7. Hence they do not generate
a semi-regular sequence. By Proposition 6.2.2 we have SB is also not semi-
regular.
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Similarly, we can prove that:
Corollary 6.2.4. The systems of quadratic equations for Flurry and Curry
with the inversion S-box are not semi-regular.
Now let us consider SEA, the system of equations that describes an AES
encryption embedded in the BES as given in 3.2.3. This system consists of
SB and the conjugate equations(
x
(e)
i,j
)2
+ x
(e+1)
i,j = 0
(
w
(e)
i,j
)2
+ w
(e+1)
i,j = 0
(
k
(e)
i,j
)2
+ k
(e+1)
i,j = 0(
x
(7)
i,j
)2
+ x
(0)
i,j = 0
(
w
(7)
i,j
)2
+ w
(0)
i,j = 0
(
k
(7)
i,j
)2
+ k
(0)
i,j = 0
In this case, the degree forms of the polynomials obviously generate a zero-
dimensional ideal, and we cannot use proposition 6.2.1. However we see that
x
(e)
i,j /∈
〈(
x
(e)
i,j
)2〉
and
x
(e)
i,j
(
x
(e)
i,jw
(e)
i,j
)
∈
〈(
x
(e)
i,j
)2〉
for any i, j, and e, i.e., there are non-trivial polynomial relations of degree
3. Thus this system is also not semi-regular.
In the same way, it can be proved that the embedded system described
in [44] for the Feistel cipher SMS4 is not semi-regular.
6.3 Polynomial Representation of the AES
over GF(2)
Here we analyze theAES representation in the form of a multivariate polyno-
mial system of quadratic equations over GF(2). As described in Section 3.2.2,
each polynomial in this system has a small number of variables. Actually,
there are several variants of the representation. First one can vary S-box
quadratic equations by linear operations as well as using only a part of them.
Also, one can write the system with more intermediate variables and linear
equations, or eliminate some variables via these linear equations. We begin
with the following lemma.
Lemma 6.3.1. Let R2 = GF(2)[X ]. Suppose G = {f1, . . . , fm} ⊂ R2 and
G′ = {f ′1, . . . , f ′m} ⊂ R2 are sets of homogeneous polynomials such that the
terms of all polynomials are square-free, 〈G〉 = 〈G′〉, and Nd = N ′d for any
d ≥ 0, where Nd and N ′d are the numbers of all polynomials of degree d in G
and G′, respectively. Then we have G is semi-regular over GF(2) iff so is G′.
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Proof. By Theorem 2.4.6, if G is semi-regular over GF(2), then the Hilbert
series of 〈x21, . . . , x2n, f1, . . . , fm〉 equals[
(1 + z)n∏m
i=1(1 + z
di)
]
=
[
(1 + z)n∏
d≥0(1 + z
d)Nd
]
,
where di = deg fi. Since Nd = N
′
d for all d, and
〈x21, . . . , x2n, f1, . . . , fm〉 = 〈x21, . . . , x2n, f ′1, . . . , f ′m〉,
G′ is also semi-regular over GF(2).
In other words, invertible linear transformations do not influence on the
semi-regularity of polynomial sequences. In the next proposition the elimi-
nation of variables using linear equations is considered.
Proposition 6.3.2. Let R′2 = GF(2)[x1, . . . , xn], R2 = R
′
2[y1, . . . , ym], and
G = {yi + gi(x1, . . . , xn), fj(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)} ⊂ R2
with 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ l, and deg(gi) = 1. Suppose hj(x1, . . . , xn) =
fj(x1, . . . , xn, g1, . . . , gm) and G
′ = {h1, . . . , hl}. Then we have if G is semi-
regular over GF(2) in R2, so is G
′ in R′2.
Proof. Let g˜i = DF (gi), f˜j = DF (fj), and h˜j = DF (h) with 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
1 ≤ j ≤ l. If f˜j(x1, . . . , xn, g˜1, . . . , g˜m) ∈ 〈x21, . . . , x2n〉 for some j, then
fj(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym) ∈ 〈x21, . . . , x2n, y1 + g˜1, . . . , ym + g˜m〉;
this contradicts the condition of the semi-regularity of G over GF(2). Hence
f˜j(x1, . . . , xn, g˜1, . . . , g˜m) = h˜j for all j, and there are square-free terms in
each hj. Further, it is clear that
〈y1+g˜1, . . . , ym+g˜m, x21, . . . , x2n, y21, . . . , y2m〉 = 〈y1+g˜1, . . . , ym+g˜m, x21, . . . , x2n〉.
Let I denote the ideal
〈x21, . . . , x2n, y21, . . . , y2m, y1 + g˜1, . . . , ym + g˜m, f˜1, . . . , f˜l〉 =
〈y1 + g˜1, . . . , ym + g˜m, x21, . . . , x2n, f˜1, . . . , f˜l〉.
As was shown in Proposition 6.2.2, the Hilbert series hR2(I) of I ⊂ R2 is
equal to the Hilbert series hR′2(I
′), where
I′ = 〈x21, . . . , x2n, h˜1, . . . , h˜l〉 ⊂ R′2.
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Since G is semi-regular over GF(2), the Hilbert series of I according to
Theorem 2.4.6 is given by
hR2(I) =
[
(1 + z)n+m∏m
i=1(1 + z) ·
∏l
j=1(1 + z
dj)
]
=
[
(1 + z)n∏l
j=1(1 + z
dj)
]
,
where dj = deg(f˜j) = deg(h˜j). By Theorem 2.4.6, G
′ is semi-regular over
GF(2).
Now we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 6.3.3. Let G = (g1, . . . , gm) be a sequence of homogeneous
polynomials in R = GF(2)[X ] = GF(2)[x1, . . . , xn]. By Dreg denote the
degree of regularity of the ideal 〈x21, . . . , x2n, g1, . . . , gm〉. Suppose that for some
subset of variables X = {xi1 , . . . , xik} ⊂ X and some polynomial g ∈ G the
following conditions hold:
1. #X < Dreg − deg(g);
2. for any t ∈ T (g) there exist xij ∈ X and xl /∈ X such that t = xijxlt′
with t′ ∈ Tdeg(g)−2.
Then G is not semi-regular over GF(2).
Proof. Consider the polynomial f = xi1 . . . xikg. By assumption, we have
deg(f) < Dreg and f ∈
〈
x2i1 , . . . , x
2
ik
〉
. Put
J =
{
x21, . . . , x
2
n
} ∪ T (g).
Since any t ∈ T (〈J〉) is divisible by x2 for some x ∈ X or by y ∈ X \X, we
have
xi1 . . . xik /∈ 〈J〉 ⊃
〈
x21, . . . , x
2
n, g
〉
.
Thus G is not semi-regular.
Corollary 6.3.4. The AES system of quadratic equations over GF(2) is not
semi-regular over GF(2).
Proof. Consider the AES system resulting after elimination all Xi variables,
which are corresponding to inputs to S-boxes, using linear equations. By
Proposition 6.3.2, if this system is not semi-regular over GF(2), so is also the
initial system. Let DFA denote the set of the degree forms of polynomials
in the AES system, and let X be the set of all variables in this system, i.e.,
X consists of all Yi and Ki variables. In the case where the AES S-box
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is described using 23 quadratic equations with a reduced number of terms
(Section 3.2.2), we have a quadratic polynomial f ∈ GF(2)[k0,0,y0,0] such
that
T2(f) ⊂
{
k
(i)
0,0 · y(j)0,0 : 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 7
}
.
By Lemma 6.3.1, we can assume w.l.o.g. that such polynomial is also included
in an S-box expression as 39 quadratic equations. Let f˜ = DF (f), then we
see that
y
(0)
0,0 . . . y
(7)
0,0 · f˜ ∈
〈(
y
(0)
0,0
)2
, . . . ,
(
y
(7)
0,0
)2〉
.
To show that this is a non-trivial relation in DFA, we need only to prove
that the degree of regularity of DFA over GF(2), denoted here by Dreg, is
more than 10. Since the value of Dreg given in [3] is asymptotic, we do not
use it. Let
U = {y(0)2i,4j : 0 ≤ i ≤ 4, 0 ≤ j ≤ 3} and u =
∏
y∈U
y.
It can directly be checked that the variables of U occur only in quadratic
terms of DFA, and if t ∈ T (DFA) is such that t = y · t′ for some y ∈ U ,
then t′ ∈ X \ U . Therefore any t ∈ T (DFA) does not divide u. We have
u 6∈ 〈J〉 ⊃ HT (〈S〉), where
S =
{
v2 : v ∈ X} ∪DFA, J = {v2 : v ∈ X} ∪ T (DFA) .
Thus, Dreg > deg(u) = 20.
In [9] Biryukov and De Cannie`re have obtained polynomial system of
quadratic equations for the block cipherKhazad, Misty1, Kasumi, Camel-
lia, and Serpent. Using Proposition 6.3.3 it can be proved that these
systems are not semi-regular over GF(2).
Chapter 7
Algebraic Collision Attacks on
AES
In this chapter we use Gro¨bner bases to improve side-channel collision attacks
on AES. Side-channel collision attacks were introduced in [51] and applied to
AES in [50, 10]. These attacks work in two steps. First an attacker applies
differential power analysis to a physical implementation of a cryptosystem to
extract some additional secret information about this system. By the second
step the attacker recovers the secret key using the derived information. In the
case of AES, the attacker detects by comparing power consumption curves
for S-box operations whether two input bytes to these S-boxes are equal.
In the basic attack proposed in [50] only collisions occurring in the input
bytes of the second round of different AES runs at equal byte positions
are used. In [10] it was shown that the equality of inputs to various S-
boxes can be detected. These collisions called generalized internal collisions
can be described as a system of polynomial equations over GF(28) in key
byte variables. In [10] only systems that can be solved by linear algebra
methods were considered. To improve these results, in our attacks non-linear
collisions as well as non-collisions are taken into account. Here we do not
discuss side-channel techniques and focus on the key recovery problem under
the assumption that generalized internal collisions, as described in [10], can
be detected. For more details on differential power analysis including the
AES case we refer the reader to [51], [50], [10], and [45].
7.1 Collisions in AES
By one or several AES runs a generalized internal collision occurs whenever
input bytes to any two S-boxes are equal. Since each round of one AES en-
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cryption has 16 S-boxes, there is a wide variety of possible collisions. However
only some of these collisions can be efficiently exploited. In the following we
describe several kinds of such useful collisions and how they can be used to
recover the full AES secret key. The first two subsections recall the known
collision attacks on AES from [50] and [10]. Then the linear and non-linear
collisions used in our algebraic collision attacks as well as non-collisions are
described.
Let us assume that m ≥ 2 plaintexts denoted by P (e) = (p(e)0 , . . . , p(e)15 )
with 1 ≤ e ≤ m are encrypted using AES-128 with a fixed secret key,
K = (k0, . . . , k15). Denote by b
(e)
i,j the jth byte of the internal state before
the ith application of the SubBytes transformation for eth AES run, and by
ki,j the jth byte of the ith round key, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 9 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 15. In
particular, we have k0,j = kj and b
(e)
0,j = p
(e)
j + kj for any j. Also we assume
that all plaintexts are known to an attacker.
7.1.1 Internal Collisions
In [50], Schramm, Leander, Felke, and Paar have proposed side-channel col-
lision attacks on AES that are based on detecting internal collisions. An
internal collision, as defined in [50], occurs, if b
(d)
i,j = b
(e)
i,j for some i, j and
d 6= e. We see that collisions between bytes of the first round give no infor-
mation about the secret key. Indeed, b
(d)
0,j = p
(d)
j + kj and b
(e)
0,j = p
(e)
j + kj are
equal iff p
(d)
j = p
(e)
j . Each byte of any state after the second round depends
on all bytes of the secret key, while any b
(e)
1,j depends on four bytes of the first
round key and one byte of the second round key. For this reason only internal
collisions between bytes of the second round are used in [50] to attack AES.
Suppose b1,0 = b
′
1,0 for some two AES runs. Since
b
(e)
1,0 = k1,0 + 02 · S(p(e)0 + k0) + 03 · S(p(e)5 + p5) + S(p(e)10 + k10) + S(p(e)15 + k15)
for any e = 1,m, we have b1,0 and b
′
1,0 collide iff
02 · S(p0 + k0) + 03 · S(p5 + p5) + S(p10 + k10) + S(p15 + k15) =
= 02 · S(p′0 + k0) + 03 · S(p′5 + p5) + S(p′10 + k10) + S(p′15 + k15).
(7.1)
If (p0, p5, p10, p15) 6= (p′0, p′5, p′10, p′15), then (7.1) describes a non-trivial rela-
tion between four bytes of the secret key and can be used to reduce the
set of possible keys. Similar equations in {k0, k5, k10, k15}, {k3, k4, k9, k14},
{k2, k7, k8, k13}, or {k1, k6, k11, k12} are derived from internal collisions be-
tween bytes of the second round at other byte positions.
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By definition, put
C(α, β, k0, k1, k2, k3) = 02 · (S(α+ k0) + S(β + k0))+
+ 03 · (S(α+ k1) + S(β + k1))+
+ S(α+ k2) + S(β + k2) + S(α+ k3) + S(β + k3)
for any α, β, k0, k1, k2, k3 ∈ GF(28). It is obvious that C(α, β, k0, k1, k2, k3) =
0 iff C(α + β, 0, k0 + β, k1 + β, k2 + β, k3 + β) = 0. The optimized attack
given in [50] works as follows. For every δ ∈ GF(28) \ {0} the set
Tδ = {(k0, k1, k2, k3) ∈ GF(28)4 : C(δ, 0, k0, k1, k2, k3) = 0}
is pre-computed and stored. Each set has on average 224 elements. The
number of the stored elements can be reduced approximately by a factor of
32 using the following property of Tδ.
Lemma 7.1.1. If (k0, k1, k2, k3) ∈ Tδ for some δ ∈ GF(28) \ {0}, then
(k0 + δ0, k1 + δ1, k2 + δ2, k3 + δ3) ∈ Tδ,
(k0 + δ0, k1 + δ1, k3 + δ3, k2 + δ2) ∈ Tδ,
where δ0, δ1, δ2, δ3 ∈ {0, δ}.
Further, to derive the secret key an attacker inputs different plaintexts
in the form of (αe, . . . , αe) with random values αe ∈ GF(28) to an AES
module. For each plaintext, the attacker measures and stores the power
consumption curves for the time periods, where b
(e)
1,0, . . . , b
(e)
1,15 are processed.
Then one look for internal collisions in each byte comparing pairwise the
corresponding power curves. To detect collisions various methods can be
used, such as square differences, cross-correlation, wavelet analysis. If for
some pair (αe, αd) an internal collision are detected, then the right value of
four bytes of the secret key belong to the set
{(k0 + αe, k1 + αe, k2 + αe, k3 + αe) : (k0, k1, k2, k3) ∈ Tαe+αd}.
The key bytes corresponding the internal collision at the ith byte position of
the second round given in Table 7.1. We see that any collisions in the bytes
of one column provides a set of possible values of the same four key bytes.
According to [50], the intersection of these sets has only one element after
about four such collisions. Thus about 16 collisions (four collisions for each
column) are required to recover the full secret key. If there is more than one
key candidate, the attacker repeats the procedure to derive addition collisions
or tests these candidates using known plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
70 7. Algebraic Collision Attacks on AES
Table 7.1: Internal collisions and corresponding key bytes
1th column (k0, k1, k2, k3) 3th column (k0, k1, k2, k3)
0 (k0, k5, k10, k15) 8 (k8, k13, k2, k7)
1 (k5, k10, k15, k0) 9 (k13, k2, k7, k8)
2 (k10, k15, k0, k5) 10 (k2, k7, k8, k13)
3 (k15, k0, k5, k10) 11 (k7, k8, k13, k2)
2th column 4th column
4 (k4, k9, k14, k3) 12 (k12, k1, k6, k11)
5 (k9, k14, k4, k4) 13 (k1, k6, k11, k12)
6 (k14, k3, k4, k9) 14 (k6, k11, k12, k1)
7 (k3, k4, k9, k14) 15 (k11, k12, k1, k6)
Let Prm be the probability that for m random plaintexts at least one
internal collision occurs in a single fixed byte. Obviously, Prm = 1 ifm > 256,
and for 2 ≤ m ≤ 256 we have
Prm = 1−
m−1∏
i=1
(1− i/28).
Since Prm > (0.5)
1/16 for any m ≥ 40, after 40 measurements the attacker
has the required number of internal collision at least in half of all cases.
7.1.2 Linear Generalized Internal Collisions
The concept of generalized internal collisions was proposed by Bogdanov
in [10]. An generalized internal collision occurs, if b
(d)
i,j = b
(e)
r,s by some two
different S-box applications, i.e., (i, j, d) 6= (r, s, e). The collisions between
bytes of the first round (i = r = 0) are called linear. The linear collisions
with j = s is trivial because they occur iff p
(d)
j = p
(e)
j , and hence they can be
rejected. If b0,j = b
′
0,s with some j 6= s, we have
kj + ks = pj + p
′
s,
and kj is known iff ks is known. Thus a set of linear generalized collisions
can be described as a system of linear equations over GF(28) in secret key
byte variables:
S :

kj1 + kj2 = ∆1
kj3 + kj4 = ∆2
. . .
kj2n−1 + kj2n = ∆n
(7.2)
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Table 7.2: Oﬄine complexity and success probabilities
Measurements, m 4 5 6 7 9 11 29
Linear equations, n 7.09 10.72 14.88 19.46 29.49 40.07 105.14
Independent variables, dS 8.81 5.88 3.74 2.20 1.15 1.04 1.00
Oﬄine complexity ≤ 40 bit 34.70 37.34 37.15 34.74 21.36 12.11 8
Pr(dS ≤ 5) 0.037 0.372 0.854 0.991 1.000 1.000 1.000
Oﬄine complexity ≤ 48 bit 43.90 45.50 44.30 41.14 21.36 12.11 8
Pr(dS ≤ 6) 0.092 0.548 0.927 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000
Here any ∆i is the sum of two known plaintext bytes. Note that in sys-
tem (7.2) there are equations not necessarily for all 16 key bytes. Moreover,
it was shown in [10] that this system has never a single solution. Let KS be
a set of all free and missing variables for S. Thus we have dS = #KS ≥ 1
for any system. Since in this case there are 28dS key candidates, the correct
key is identified using a known plaintext-ciphertext pair. The dependence of
dS on the number of measurements was analyzed in [10]. The results of this
analysis is given in Table 7.2.
Thus, using linear collision attacks one can derive the secret key after 5
measurements in 245.5 steps on average with a probability of 0.548, while with
6 measurements the attack works in 237.15 steps and has a success probability
of 0.85. We see also that after 11 measurements the expected oﬄine attack
complexity is about 212.11, and practically all systems being solvable.
7.1.3 Non-linear Generalized Internal Collisions
To improve the results of the above collision attacks we consider linear col-
lisions in combination with other kinds of generalized internal collisions. If
input bytes b
(d)
i,j and b
(e)
r,s of two S-boxes collide, we have the simple linear
equation over GF(28):
b
(d)
i,j + b
(e)
r,s = 0,
which corresponds to 8 linear equations over GF(2) in bit variables. On the
other hand, each of these bytes depends on bytes of some plaintext and the
secret key. This relation can be described by a system of polynomial equa-
tions, for example, using one of the AES representation given in Section 3.2.
For all bytes except the inputs of the first round, the corresponding system
is not linear, and so a generalized internal collision between b
(d)
i,j and b
(e)
r,s with
i 6= 1 or r 6= 1 is called non-linear. It is clear that one can derive a sys-
tem of equations for any subset of all detected generalized internal collision.
The general idea of algebraic collision attacks is to extract some information
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about the secret key by solving one of such systems. In our case we use
Algorithm 3 with the Fauge`re F4 algorithm for Gro¨bner basis finding. Note
that not for all subset of collisions the corresponding system can be solved
efficient even if the number of detected collisions is large enough. In our at-
tacks we use two types of non-linear collision, FS- and FL-collisions, defined
below. Systems of equations corresponding to these collisions are specified
in the next section, and results of analysis are given in Section 7.3.
First we consider collisions that occur in the AES between bytes of the
first two rounds. We call them FS-collisions. We can distinguish between the
following three subtypes of FS-collisions: linear collisions in the first round,
nonlinear collisions between the first two rounds, and nonlinear collisions
within the second round. Each non-trivial collision of the first subtype lin-
early binds two bytes of the secret key, while the other collisions describe
non-linear relations between four or more key bytes.
Naturally, one can likewise consider collisions occurring between bytes of
the first three, four, and so on rounds. However, in these cases the structure
of obtained polynomial systems is more difficult. We propose a more efficient
attack based on collisions between bytes of the first and last rounds. We call
such collisions FL-collisions. An FL-collision can be one of the following
types:
b
(d)
0,i = b
(e)
0,s, b
(d)
0,i = b
(e)
9,s, and b
(d)
9,i = b
(e)
9,s
with 0 ≤ i, s ≤ 15 and 1 ≤ d, e ≤ m.
By comparing the corresponding power consumption curves for S-box
operations one can also detect that b
(d)
i,j 6= b(e)r,s for some 0 ≤ i, r ≤ 10, 0 ≤
j, s ≤ 15 and 1 ≤ d, e ≤ m. In such case, we say that (b(d)i,j , b(e)r,s) is a non-
collision. In Section 7.3.3 we show how non-collisions can be used to improve
collision attacks. Note also that four more S-boxes are applied in each round
of the key schedule. Collisions and non-collisions with these S-boxes can be
used in our attacks as well.
7.2 Algebraic Representation of Non-linear
Collision
In this section we describe systems of polynomial equations for FS- and FL-
collisions as well as combined systems.
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7.2.1 FS-Collisions
For algebraic collision attacks based on FS-collisions, we use systems of
quadratic equations over GF(2), which are derived from the polynomial rep-
resentation of the AES given in Section 3.2.2. In this case, a polynomial
system consists of two parts. One of them describes the first round of the
AES encryption for all given plaintexts and the first round of the key sched-
ule, while the equations of the second subsystem correspond to all detected
FS-collisions. The set of variables consists of:
• 128 bit variables for the initial key; we use k(0)i,j to denote the jth bit
variable for the ith byte of the initial key;
• 128 bit variables for the first round key; we use k(1)i,j to denote the jth
bit variable for the ith byte of the first round key;
• 128 ·m bit variables for all inputs of the first S-box layer; we use x(e)i,j to
denote the jth bit variable for the ith byte of the internal state before
the first SubBytes transformation by encryption of P (e);
• 128 ·m bit variables for all outputs of the first S-box layer; we use y(e)i,j
to denote the jth bit variable for the ith byte of the internal state after
the first SubBytes transformation by encryption of P (e);
• 128 · m bit variables for all inputs of the second S-box layer; we use
z
(e)
i,j to denote the jth bit variable for the ith byte of the internal state
before the second SubBytes transformation by encryption of P (e);
where m is the number of different AES runs, 0 ≤ i ≤ 15, 0 ≤ j ≤ 7, and
1 ≤ e ≤ m.
For FS-collisions and m known plaintexts, each polynomial system we
consider is the union of the following set of equations:
1. S-box equations of the first round for allAES runs. Each of these equa-
tions is quadratic over GF(2) and has only 16 variables, x
(e)
i,0 , . . . , x
(e)
i,7 ,
and y
(e)
i,0 , . . . , y
(e)
i,7 for some 0 ≤ i ≤ 15, 1 ≤ e ≤ m.
2. Linear equations that describe the composition of the ShiftRows, Mix-
Columns, and AddRoundKey transformations of the first round for all
known plaintexts. For each z
(e)
i,j , there is exactly one equation, and the
polynomial of this equation is the sum of k
(1)
i,j and a linear combination
of some y
(e)
r,s .
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3. Equations of the first round of the key schedule. Recall that to express
the first four bytes of the round key, quadratic S-box equations are
used, while equations for the other key bits are linear.
4. The plaintext equations:
x
(e)
i,j + k
(0)
i,j + p
(e)
i,j = 0,
for all i, j, e; here p
(e)
i,j is the jth bit of the ith byte of P
(e).
5. Equations for all detected FS-collisions. For a linear collision in the
first round, i.e., if b
(d)
0,i = b
(e)
0,r for some 0 ≤ i, r ≤ 15, 1 ≤ d, e ≤ m, we
get x
(d)
i,j + x
(e)
r,j = 0 with 0 ≤ j ≤ 7. If b(d)0,i = b(e)1,r, then x(d)i,j + z(e)r,j = 0
for all 0 ≤ j ≤ 7; and z(d)i,0 + z(e)r,0 = · · · = z(d)i,7 + z(e)r,7 = 0 in the case
b
(d)
1,i = b
(e)
1,r. In the same way, one can describe the case of b = b
′, where
b or b′ is an input to some S-box of the first two rounds of key schedule.
6. The GF(2)-field equations for all used variables.
The number of variables and equations can be reduced as follows. For
any AES runs, the initial state after the first round is unknown, and only
the collision equations contain an information about the secret key in the
constructed system. If an input byte to some S-box of the second round
does not collide with any other input byte, then the linear equations for the
corresponding z
(e)
i,0 , . . . , z
(e)
i,7 can be removed from the system. Combining the
linear equations for all other z
(e)
i,j with collision equations, we can rewrite the
system without the variables of the second round. Further, all x
(e)
i,j can be
eliminated using the plaintext equations. Obviously, the new system can be
directly written for any set of detected FS-collisions. We see also that the
number of quadratic equations of the obtained system does not depend on
this set.
7.2.2 FL-Collisions
In the last round of the AES encryption the MixColumns transformation is
not applied, and we have
S(b
(e)
9,j) = k10,pi(j) + c
(e)
pi(j)
for all 0 ≤ j ≤ 15, 1 ≤ e ≤ m, where C(e) = (c(e)0 , . . . , c(e)15 ) is the ciphertext
and
pi =
(
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12 1 6 11
)
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is the permutation corresponding to ShiftRows. Assume that C(1), . . . , C(m)
are known. For FL-collisions, we get
b
(d)
0,i = b
(e)
0,s iff k0,i + k0,s = p
(d)
i + p
(e)
s ;
b
(d)
9,i = b
(e)
9,s iff k10,pi(i) + k10,pi(s) = c
(d)
pi(i) + c
(e)
pi(s);
b
(d)
0,i = b
(e)
9,s iff k0,i + p
(d)
i = S
−1(k10,pi(s) + c
(e)
pi(s)).
We see that FL-collisions correspond to some relations between bytes of
the initial key and the last round key. These relations can be obviously ex-
pressed as a system of quadratic equations over GF(2). Now we show how to
derive a system of quadratic equations over GF(28) for these collisions. One
way is to use the BES expression as is described in Section 3.2.3. However we
have 8 variables per one key byte in this case. We describe a simpler system,
which has only 32 variables.
It is clear that FL-collisions of the first two types can be expressed as
linear equations over GF(28). Let us consider a nonlinear FL-collision of the
third type. Its algebraic expression is given by:
S
(
k0,i + p
(d)
i
)
= k10,j + c
(e)
j ,
for some 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 15, 1 ≤ d, e ≤ m. Recall that the AES S-box is the
composition of the multiplicative inverse in the finite field GF(28), the GF(2)-
linear mapping, and the XOR-addition of the constant 63. Recall that the
inverse of the GF(2)-linear mapping is given by the following polynomial over
GF(28):
f(x) = 6ex2
7
+ dbx2
6
+ 59x2
5
+ 78x2
4
+ 5ax2
3
+ 7fx2
2
+ fex2 + 05x.
Hence we have(
k0,i + p
(d)
i
)−1
= f
(
k10,j + c
(e)
j + 63
)
= f
(
k10,j) + f
(
c
(e)
j + 63
)
.
If we replace f(k10,j) by a new variable k˜10,j, we obtain the quadratic equation(
k0,i + p
(d)
i
)(
k˜10,j + f
(
c
(e)
j + 63
))
= 1,
which holds with probability 255
256
. The following proposition follows:
Proposition 7.2.1. Solutions to the equation S(k0,i + p
(d)
i ) = k10,j + c
(e)
j
coincides with solutions to the equation(
k0,i + p
(d)
i
)(
k˜10,j + f
(
c
(e)
j + 63
))
= 1
under the change of variables k˜10,j = f(k10,j) with a probability of
255
256
.
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Moreover, if k10,i + k10,j = ∆(i,d),(j,e) = c
(d)
i + c
(e)
j for some 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 15
and 1 ≤ d, e ≤ m, then we have
f(k10,i) + f(k10,j) = k˜10,i + k˜10,j = f(∆(i,d),(j,e)).
Thus we derive for FL-collisions the system S of quadratic equations over
GF(28) in 32 variables K = {k0,i, k˜10,i}0≤i≤15. Furthermore, each equation
of the resulting system S has only two variables. We call such equations
binomial. Note that the last round key is connected with the initial key by
the AES key schedule, however equations for the key schedule as well as
the field equations are not included in our polynomial systems in the case
of FL-collisions. Also, we ignore the S-boxes of the last round of the key
schedule.
7.2.3 Combined Systems of Equations
The systems of equations given above describe FS- and FL-collisions sepa-
rately. In the following we show that for successful algebraic collision attack
on AES a combined approach can be used also. In this case, FL-collisions
must be however expressed by polynomial systems over GF(2). Moreover,
equations that describe collisions between the S-boxes of two last rounds
are included in these systems. Thus the crude combined systems hold the
following equations over GF(2):
1. S-box equations of the first and last rounds, i.e., quadratic equations
describing the relationship between input and output of the S-boxes at
the first and last rounds;
2. Equations corresponding to the linear transformation of the first round;
3. Equations that describe the inverse linear transformation of the round
next to the last one (round 9);
4. Key schedule equations for the first and last rounds; one of them de-
scribe the relationship between the first round key and the initial key,
and the others bind the subkeys of two last rounds; the intermediate
key schedule equations are not included in the systems;
5. Plaintext and ciphertext equations;
6. Collision equations; in this case only a part of equations express the
equality of inputs to some S-boxes. These are equations derived from
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one of the following collisions
b0,i = b
′
0,j b0,i = b
′
1,j b1,i = b
′
1,j
b0,i = b
′
9,j b1,i = b
′
9,j
with 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 15. For each collision in one of the following forms
b0,i = b
′
8,j b8,i = b
′
8,j
b8,i = b
′
9,j b9,i = b
′
9,j
with 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 15, we have 8 linear equations in variables for outputs
of the corresponding S-boxes. Here br,i or b
′
r,i can be also an input to an
S-box in the key schedule, where r = 0, 1, 8, 9, and 12 ≤ i ≤ 15. Note
that equations for collisions in the form of b1,i = b
′
8,j are not included
in the system.
Using linear equations one can eliminate the variables that describe inputs
of the first two rounds and outputs of the S-boxes of the last two rounds.
Then the resulting systems have 512 variables for K(1), K(2), K(10), K(11)
as well as 128 ·m variables for outputs of the first S-box layer and 128 ·m
variables for inputs to the S-boxes of the last round, where m is the number
of the known plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
7.2.4 Non-Collisions
A set of non-collisions can be also described as a system of polynomial equa-
tions over GF(2) as well as over GF(28). Suppose two bytes b1 = {x7x6 . . . x0}
and b2 = {y7y6 . . . y0} do not collide, i.e., b1 6= b2. Then bit variables satisfy
the following equation over GF(2):
7∏
i=0
(xi + yi + 1) = 0.
The corresponding equation over GF(28) is given by
(b1 + b2)
255 + 1 = 0.
The degree of the first equation is equal to 8, and the number of the terms
is exactly 38 = 6561, while the equation over GF(28) has degree 255 and
257 terms. Both equations seem to be useless for Gro¨bner basis attacks.
However, there are more constructive applications of non-collisions reducing
the search for several unknown bytes. These are specific for the structure of
nonlinear equation systems we use and are explained in Subsection 7.3.3.
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7.3 Algebraic Analysis of Collisions
In this section we analyze the systems of equations constructed above. We
show how many AES runs are needed to recover the full secret key. Several
ways to accelerate the process of finding the Gro¨bner bases for the com-
bined systems are introduced and discussed, including chains of variables
in binomial equations, non-linear cycles and search optimization using non-
collisions.
7.3.1 Expected Number of Collisions
First note that b1 = b2 = · · · = br will be considered as r− 1 collisions for all
r ≥ 2. Then the number of collisions between b1, . . . , bn obviously is equal
to n − d, where d is the number of different elements. Let { nd } denote the
Stirling number of the second kind, i.e., the number of ways to partition a
set of n elements into d nonempty subsets. This number is given by
{n
d
}
=
1
n!
·
d∑
i=0
(−1)d−i
(
d
i
)
in.
If d < 28, all subsets can be tagged with different elements of GF(28) in
256 ·255 · · · · · (256−d+1) ways. Therefore for n random elements of GF(28),
the average number of collisions can be computed from
N(n) =
1
256n
·
n′∑
d=1
(n− d)
{n
d
} 256!
(256− d)! ,
where n′ = min{n, 256}. We use this formula to estimate the expected
number of FS- and FL-collisions after the AES encryption of m random
plaintexts. In the case of FS-collisions, the S-box operation is applied 32m
times in the first two rounds of the encryption and 8 times in the first two
rounds of the key schedule. For FL-collisions, n = 32m+4, since the S-boxes
of the last round of the key schedule are not considered here. By combined
approach, one looks for collisions between inputs to 64m + 16 S-boxes, but
ignores collisions in the form of b1 = b
′
8, where b1 and b
′
8 are input bytes of the
second and next to last rounds respectively. The result for m = 2, 3, 4, 5 is
given in Table 7.3.1. Note that some collisions can be trivial, that is collisions
occurring independently of the secret key.
Since from a non-trivial collision one can derive some information about
one key byte, at least 16 collisions are required to recover the full secret
key, otherwise several bytes must be guessed. In the case of FL-collisions
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Table 7.3: Expected number of collisions after m measurements, Em
Measurements 2 3 4 5
Type of Coll. Em
b0 = b
′
0 2.35 4.86 8.18 12.27
FS b0 = b
′
1 4.43 8.68 13.98 20.10
b1 = b
′
1 2.35 4.86 8.18 12.27∑
9.13 18.40 30.34 44.64
b0 = b
′
0 2.35 4.86 8.18 12.27
FL b0 = b
′
9 3.96 8.07 13.25 19.28
b9 = b
′
9 1.86 4.15 7.28 11.18∑
8.17 17.08 28.71 42.73
Comb.
∑
22.69 56.74 90.04 128.62
as well as by the combined approach one needs more collisions, because the
intermediate key schedule equations are not included in our systems and
there are more independent variables. However, it is not necessary to know
the value of all variables. It is enough to find the key bytes of either the first
or last round.
7.3.2 Binomial Equations, Chains and Cycles
We consider only binomial equations in key variables. They describe linear
collisions of the first and last rounds as well as non-linear FL-collisions. We
see that each system for FL-collisions introduced in Subsection 7.2.2 consists
of only these equations.
Let S be a system of nonlinear equations for FL-collisions. In this case,
the set of variables is
K = {ki, k˜i : 0 ≤ i ≤ 15},
where ki and k˜i are the initial key and last round key variables, respectively.
Consider a partition of K
K = K1 ∪ · · · ∪ Kn, Ki ∩ Kj = ∅, i 6= j
such that
1. for any 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n and any two variables vi ∈ Ki and vj ∈ Kj there
is no equation in v1, v2 in S;
2. no Ki has a partition that satisfies the first property.
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We say that a subset of the variables is connected w.r.t. S, if this sub-
set has no partition that satisfies the first property. Thus each Ki is con-
nected. Then the system S can be partitioned into n isolated subsystem
Si corresponding to Ki. Pairs (Ki,Si) are called chains. Obviously, Si = ∅
iff Ki = {v} for some variable v ∈ K. In this case the right value of the
variable v can only be guessed. If u, v ∈ Ki for some i, then there exist
v0 = u, v1, . . . , vt = v ∈ Ki such that Si contains a binomial equations
p1(v0, v1) = p2(v1, v2) = · · · = pt(vt−1, vt) = 0.
The case Si is a linear subsystem was considered in [10]. We have rank(Si) =
#Ki−1, and if we fix some variable vi1 ∈ Ki, the other variables vij ∈ Ki are
given by vij = vi1 +∆ij with ∆ij ∈ GF(28). Suppose now Si has one or more
quadratic equations, i.e., Ki ∩ {k0, . . . , k15} 6= ∅ and Ki ∩ {k˜0, . . . , k˜15} 6= ∅.
Let v ∈ Ki. Since Ki is connected, there is a relation between v and any
other variable x ∈ Ki. These relations can be expressed as linear or quadratic
equations in two variables. Indeed, let x, y, z ∈ Ki, and
x · y + α · x+ β · y + γ = 0; x+ z = δ,
where α, β, γ, δ ∈ GF(28). If v + x = δ¯, we get
v · y + α · v + (β + δ¯) · y + (γ + α · δ¯) = 0; v + z = δ + δ¯.
In the case x · v + α¯ · x+ β¯ · v + γ¯ = 0 we have
(v + α¯)(x · y + α · x+ β · y + γ) + (y + α)(x · v + α¯ · x+ β¯ · v + γ¯) =
(β + β¯) · v · y + (α · β¯ + γ) · v + (α¯ · β + γ¯) · y + (α¯ · γ + α · γ¯) = 0,
and
v · z + α¯ · z + (β¯ + δ) · v + (γ¯ + α¯ · δ) = 0.
We see that the degree of S-polynomials does not increase and is ≤ 2. There-
fore a Gro¨bner basis for S can be found quickly.
Let us now show how many solutions Si has in the non-linear case. As an
example, if Ki = {v, u}, and Si has two non-linear equations in u, v, then v is
a root of a quadratic equation in one variable. Therefore Si has two solutions
in this case. If #Si ≥ 3, then the solution is single. Generally, we say that
Ki is strongly connected w.r.t. Si, if there is a non-linear equation e ∈ Si
such that Ki is connected w.r.t. Si \ {e}. Such chains are called cycles. It
can be shown that in this case Si has at most two solutions. Moreover, the
solution is single, if Ki is strongly connected w.r.t. Si \ {e}.
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Thus the number of solutions of the whole system S is equal to
∏m
i=1 2
qi ,
where qi ≤ 1, if Ki is strongly connected, and qi = 8 otherwise. Note that
both the number of initial key candidates and the number of last round key
candidates can be less than the number of all solutions. Clearly, it is enough
to consider one of these subsets, the minimal one. If it also has more that
one solutions, the correct key can be detected using the key schedule as well
as known plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Experimental results for FL-collisions
are given in Section 7.3.4.
Further, consider a combined system. It has a subsystem that consists
of FL-collision equations rewritten over GF(2). However, in this case the
non-linear equations are not binomial. This has a dramatical impact on
the run time of Gro¨bner basis computation. To soften this impact we first
solve all cycles over GF(28), then substitute the obtained solution for the
corresponding bit variables in the combined system, and solve the rest of
equation over GF(2).
If a system over GF(2) cannot be solved in a reasonable time, one can
guess several key byte and try to solve the system again. Here the chains
that are not cycles are used. As shown above, the chains possess the property
that one element of the chain uniquely defines all the other elements of the
chain. The strategy applied below is to find h longest chains and to guess
one byte in each of them. This allows to determine the maximal number of
the unknowns in the system by the same cost of guessing.
7.3.3 Speedup Using Non-Collisions
In the case of combined systems as well as systems for FS-collisions, we some-
times guess h bytes before solving as described in the previous subsection.
This means that we need to solve 28·h resulting systems to recover the secret
key. In the most practical attacks, h can be 1 or 2. Now we show how the
number of guesses can be reduced using non-collisions introduced in Subsec-
tion 7.2.4. Instead of constructing implicit degree 8 nonlinear equations, we
make use of the non-collisions explicitly in the following way.
Let C1, . . . , Ch denote the h longest chains of variables induced by bino-
mial equations in question, each being of length |Ci| = li with 1 ≤ i ≤ h,
and Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for i 6= j. The variables of the chain Ci are denoted by ci,j
for 1 ≤ j ≤ li. Each of them corresponds either to initial key byte or to final
key byte. Set
Bi,j = (p
(1)
r + ci,j, p
(2)
r + ci,j, . . . , p
(m)
r + ci,j),
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if cij = k0,r, and
Bi,j = (S
−1(c(1)r + ci,j), S
−1(c(2)r + ci,j), . . . , S
−1(c(m)r + ci,j))
in the case of ci,j = k10,r; here m is the number of measurements with known
plaintext/ciphertext pairs. In other words, we connect each chain with the
table of values of input bytes to the corresponding S-boxes. For any guess
(c1,1, c2,1, . . . , ch,1), we obtain all other elements of chains using the collision
equations and define the tables as above. Then we can register all collisions
occurring in these tables and compare the resulting list with the set of all
collisions as well as non-collisions detected by measure. It is clear that the
list contains the true collisions, since they are used to derive elements of the
chains. However if the guess is wrong, it is possible that in the tables we have
a collision between two S-boxes, where non-collision was detected in reality.
This allow to optimize the search for chain evaluations. The procedure can
be formalized using Algorithm 5:
Algorithm 5 Sieving guesses with non-collisions and non-linear cycles
Require: h chains C1, . . . , Ch of lengths l1, . . . , lh with 2
8h possible evalua-
tions, and the list L of all collisions detected for these chains
1: for each guess (c1,1, . . . , ch,1) ∈ {0, . . . , 28h − 1} do
2: for each chain i = 1 : h do
3: Evaluate Bi,1
4: for each chain variable ci,j j = 2 : li do
5: Evaluate ci,j and Bi,j using chain equations
6: end for
7: end for
8: for each (bi,j,k, br,s,t) of
l(l−1)
2
pairs of table elements in T =
((B1,1, . . . , B1,l1), . . . , (Bh,1, . . . , Bh,lh)) /* where l = m ·
∑
li */ do
9: if bi,j,k = br,s,t then
10: Verify if the corresponding collision ε lies in L
11: if ε 6∈ L then
12: Go to 1 (contradiction is detected)
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
16: Output the guess (c11, . . . , ch1) as a candidate evaluation of the chains
17: end for
In our experiments we had h ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Table 7.3.3 and Table 7.3.3 show
the speedup we obtained on average using the sieving technique in these cases.
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Table 7.4: Number of candidate chain evaluations before and after sieving
using non-collisions (with and without nonlinear cycles) averaged over 5000
samples for 3 measurements, the case of FL-collisions
After After After Average
h Before (without cycles) (with cycles) on average speed-up
1 256 168.9 93.7 149 1.72
2 216 214.36 213.23 214.08 3.78
3 224 221 219.7 220.77 9.38
Table 7.5: Number of candidate chain evaluations before and after sieving
using non-collisions averaged over 1000000 samples for m measurements with
m = 4, 5, and 6, the case of FS-collisions
m 6 5 4
h 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Before 256 216 224 256 216 224 256 216 224
After 256 212.82 218.07 256 214.08 220.38 256 215.26 222.44
Speed-up 1 9.09 60.96 1 3.77 12.33 1 1.67 2.94
Note that in the case of FL-collisions contradictions can occur also within
one chain, since here we have non-linear relations between key bytes. Hence
in this case we can use Algorithm 5 with any h ≥ 1. For linear chains, the
method works only if we guess two or more bytes. Further, in the case of a
combined system, we first solve all cycles separately, as was described above.
But these cycles can be also used after their solutions are found. Adding
them to an input of Algorithm 5 we detect more false evaluations for other
chains. For 3 measurements, cycles occur in about 25% of all cases (averaged
over 1000000 samples).
7.3.4 Experimental Results
Solving Equations for FS-Collisions
The straightforward application of the Fauge`re F4 algorithm to the system
constructed in Subsection 7.2.1 gives results superior to those in [10]. These
are summarized in Table 7.3.4.
The system of nonlinear equations is considered over GF(2). For m in-
puts (m measurements) there are 128 variables of the first subkey K(1), 128
variables of the second subkey K(2) and 128 ·m intermediate variables for the
output bits of the first round S-box layer. The collision-independent equa-
tions include 16 · t ·m quadratic equations over GF(2) connecting the inputs
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Table 7.6: Solving equation systems for FS-collisions over GF(2)
Measurements 5 5 4 4
Success prob. 0.425 0.932 0.042 0.397
Run time, s 142.8 7235.8 71.5 6456.0
Memory limit, MB 500 500 500 500
# of variables 896 896 768 768
# of linear equations 96 + 8c 96 + 8c 96 + 8c 96 + 8c
# of quadratic equations? (t = 23) 1932 1932 1564 1564
# of quadratic equations? (t = 39) 3276 3276 2652 2652
?without the field equations, the number of which equals the number of variable.
and outputs of the first round S-boxes, and 4 · t quadratic and 12 · 8 = 96
linear equations connecting K(1) and K(2) using the key schedule relations.
Here t is the number of quadratic equations used to express the AES S-box,
and in our experiments we have considered the both variants described in
Section 3.2.2, i.e., we have t = 23 or 39. Each of the three types of FS-
collisions add 8 linear equations to the system, resulting in 8 · c equations
if c collision occurred. In additional, the field equations for all variables are
included in the system.
The system is solved in the following way. First the system is passed to
the F4 algorithm without modifications. If it is not solvable, one guesses the
largest connected linear component and tries to solve the system again. As
a criterion of solvability, the memory cost was used. The reason why we use
this criterion is the following. Suppose for some system the Gro¨bner basis
computation has a high memory cost, then this means that in internal steps
of the F4 algorithm, the Macaulay matrices that must be transformed are
large. Thus the Gro¨bner basis computation for this system must have also
a high time cost. On the other hand, there are systems that can be solved
much slower than on average but in a reasonable time and with the same
memory cost. We set the memory limit for the Magma program to 500 MB.
Actually one usual requires less than 300 MB memory in the case of solvable
systems. Moreover, for the case where the Gro¨bner basis computation needs
more memory, to guess the next largest chain seems to be a better strategy
than to raise the memory limit. Also, comparing experimental results for
systems with a different number of S-box equations, we conclude that for our
attacks the variant with t = 23 is more suitable in terms of the time cost,
e.g., the ratio of the run times is about 3.9 for t = 39 and t = 23. However,
there are cases where the secret key can be derived only if all S-box equations
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Table 7.7: Solving equation systems for FL-collisions over GF(28)
Measurements 5 4
Success probability 1.00 0.82
Time for finding Gro¨bner basis, ms 3 5
# of guesses ≤ 232 ≤ 232
Memory limit, MB 500 500
Number of variables 32 32
Average number of equations 43.58 29.66
are included in the system.
It can be seen from Table 7.3.4 that for 5 measurements most (> 93%)
instances of the FS-system can be solved within several hours on a PC. For 4
measurements, less systems are solvable (about 40%) within approx. 2 hours.
These attacks work in the plaintext scenario.
Solving Equations for FL-Collisions
FL-collisions lead, as a rule, to more efficient results. Each equation binds
only two GF(28)-variables, since one deals with binomial equations intro-
duced in Subsection 7.2.2. There are 32 variables K over GF(28). The
algebraic relations on these variables are much simpler, since one has both
plaintext and ciphertext bytes (more information related to the detected
collisions). Moreover, there are nonlinear subsystems (cycles) solvable inde-
pendently (see Subsection 7.3.3). On average there are 1.02 cycles covering
30.08 out of 32 GF(28)-variables for 5 measurements and 0.99 cycles covering
20.08 out of 32 GF(28)-variables for 4 measurements. Statistically there are
43.58 collisions for 5 measurements and 29.66 collisions for 4 measurements.
Table 7.3.4 contains the results for applying the F4 algorithm to FL-
systems of nonlinear equations averaged over 10000 samples. After resolving
the nonlinear subsystems using F4, we guess variables defining the remaining
bytes in a way similar to the linear collision attacks (see Subsection 7.1.2
and Subsection 7.3.3). For 5 measurements practically all FL-systems are
solvable in several seconds (232 simple oﬄine operations), an FL-system being
solvable with a probability of 0.82 within several seconds (232 simple oﬄine
operations) for 4 measurements.
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Table 7.8: Solving combined equation systems
Measurements 3 3 3
Success prob. 0.072 0.419 0.698
Run time 98.31 sec 4.24 hours 22.03 days
Memory limit, MB 500 500 500
h, number of chains guessed 0 1 2
Solving the Combined Systems
Though FS- and, first of all, FL-systems perform well for 4 and 5 measure-
ments, their solution for 3 measurements is either extremely improbable or
rather infeasible. Here a combined approach has to be used.
To solve the nonlinear systems we executed Algorithm 6. The results
Algorithm 6 Solving combined systems of nonlinear equations
1: if there are nonlinear cycles in the binomial chains then
2: Resolve the cycles over GF(28) using F4 or brute-force
3: Define bytes of the dependent chains
4: end if
5: Find the h longest binomial chains
6: Execute Algorithm 5 for sieving chain evaluations
7: for each non-contradicting evaluation of h chains do
8: Find Gro¨bner basis for the reduced combined system of nonlinear equa-
tions with F4
9: if the Gro¨bner basis 6= {1} then
10: Verify the key candidates using a known plaintext-ciphertext pair
11: end if
12: end for
of the application of this algorithm to the combined system of nonlinear
equations (with additional collisions) for 3 measurements can be found in
Table 7.3.4. The system is solvable with a probability of 0.698 within 22
days or with a probability of 0.419 within 4.24 hours or with a probability of
0.072 within several minutes.
Chapter 8
Summary and Outlook
The topic of this thesis is the application of Gro¨bner bases in cryptanalysis
of block ciphers. We investigate several aspects of algebraic cryptanalysis,
e.g., Gro¨bner basis attacks with a minimal known plaintext/ciphertext pairs,
the algebraic structure of polynomial representations of ciphers as well as
a combination of Gro¨bner basis methods with other types of cryptanalysis.
Note that at the beginning it was not clear whether Gro¨bner bases can be
successfully applied to cryptanalysis of block ciphers, since polynomial sys-
tems occurring here are, as a rule, very huge. However, the thesis provides
with several examples, where such application is possible.
We have shown that Gro¨bner basis technique can be used to successfully
mount key-recovery attacks on block ciphers with a large block and key size
as well as a good resistance against differential and linear cryptanalysis. The
algebraically structure of these cipher, however, must be relatively simple.
We have constructed Flurry and Curry - two parametrized families of
block ciphers representing Feistel networks and SPN ciphers, respectively. We
have designed them so that all above conditions hold. Moreover, parameters
of these ciphers, as the number of rounds, the number of S-boxes, S-box
functions, linear transformations, etc., can be varied independently. This
allows to study how algebraic attacks depend on these parameters. We have
demonstrated that some of the constructed ciphers are vulnerable against
practical Gro¨bner basis attacks. Also, we have shown how for a set of these
ciphers the key recovery problem can be efficiently reduced to a Gro¨bner
basis conversion problem. The method allows to obtain a DRL Gro¨bner basis
for block ciphers with a polynomial S-box without a polynomial reduction.
Using complexity bounds for the FGLM algorithm, we have derived an upper
bound for the time and space complexity of Gro¨bner basis attacks on this
ciphers.
Can our method be applied to other iterated block ciphers, for example,
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to AES? The positive answer is given in Chapter 5. Using a polynomial
representation of the S-box over GF(28), we have shown how to derive a
DRL zero-dimensional Gro¨bner basis for AES-128. In this case, however,
the degree of each non-linear polynomial is equal to 254. We have considered
several possible approaches to use this Gro¨bner basis and shown that any of
them is not suitable for successful attacks.
Note also that all Gro¨bner basis attacks on Flurry and Curry given
above require a minimal number of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs. More-
over, even if more than one pairs are known, the attacker describes and solves
a system of polynomial equations only for one of them, while the other pairs
are used to detect the correct key in the case of several solutions. However,
algebraic attacks with many known plaintext/ciphertext pairs is an inter-
sting topic. At FSE’07 [33] Fauge`re proposed Gro¨bner basis attacks with
several chosen plaintexts on Flurry. From experimental results it follows
that in the case of monomial S-boxes (as defined in Chapter 4) a system of
equations describing the encryption of several plaintexts can be solved more
quickly than a system for a single pair. At the same time, this property does
not hold for the inversion S-box, i.e., here the time of Gro¨bner basis com-
putation increases with number of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs. This is
an interesting result, since in the case of a single known plaintext/ciphertext
pair Flurry with a monomial S-box is more secure against Gro¨bner basis
attacks than the cipher with the same parameters but inversion S-box. Thus
algebraic attacks with many known plaintext/ciphertext pairs need a further
investigation.
Since successful Gro¨bner basis attacks on block ciphers are possible, it
must be studied carefully how Gro¨bner basis algorithms depend on the struc-
ture of polynomial systems corresponding to block ciphers. One of the possi-
ble approaches is based on the notation of semi-regular sequences of polyno-
mials (e.g., [3], [2], [4]). The behavior of the F5 Gro¨bner basis algorithm and
the XL algorithm in the case of semi-regular sequences are well understood
([3], [2], [4], and [1]). Unfortunately, we have shown that this concept is not
very useful for cryptanalysis of block ciphers. Using the AES as an example,
we have considered three algebraic representations for block ciphers. We have
proved that the BES and AES polynomial equations over GF(28) are not
semi-regular, and that the AES systems of quadratic equations over GF(2)
are not semi-regular over GF(2). Our methods can be also used to analyze
polynomial expressions for other iterated block ciphers. For example, it can
be checked that the multivariate polynomial systems of equations, given for
many cryptosystem in [9], are not semi-regular over GF(2). Thus in two ma-
jor cases, polynomial systems described the key recovery problem for block
ciphers are neither semi-regular nor semi-regular over GF(2). Our proof is
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based on non-trivial relations between the degree forms of S-box equations.
Since here the equations are non-homogeneous, these non-trivial relations do
not imply the reduction to zero. In other word, not all of them form syzygies
for the whole polynomials. We conjecture that the presence of a large num-
ber of such relations1 reduces the complexity of Gro¨bner basis computations
for non-homogeneous systems. It is an open problem whether there exist
non-trivial relations of small degree between polynomials of different rounds
in polynomial systems for iterated block ciphers.
Note that one case of semi-regular representation for block ciphers, how-
ever, has been found. We have shown that the Gro¨bner basis for the AES is
semi-regular.
Further, we have presented a new method of side-channel cryptanaly-
sis - algebraic collision attacks. Actually, the method applies the standard
technique of power analysis to derive some information from a device, but
takes an original approach to recover the secret key using this informations.
In this thesis we apply it to attack AES, but we guess that this method
works also for many other block ciphers, if their implementation is vulnera-
ble against side-channel attacks. A necessary condition for algebraic collision
attacks is that generalized internal collisions, as described in [10], can be de-
tected. We have demonstrated that systems of polynomials equations that
describe several subsets of generalized internal collisions can be successfully
solved in a reasonable time by Gro¨bner basis computations. Moreover, our
approach allows to improve collision attacks both in terms of measurements
and post-processing complexity. Also, several ways to speed up algebraic col-
lision attacks were proposed. For the AES block cipher, we have described
several efficient algebraic collision attacks. One of them is based on gener-
alized internal collisions occurring within the first two rounds. It works in
the known-plaintext scenario and requires 5 measurements to derive the full
secret key within several hours on a PC with success probability 0.93. This
attack with 4 measurements recovers key in about 40% of all cases. The sec-
ond attack works in the known plaintext/ciphertext pair scenario but leads
to more efficient results: the key can be obtained in several seconds of oﬄine
computations with success probability of 0.82 for 4 measurements, and with
probability close to 1 for 5 measurements. We also have proposed a success-
ful algebraic collision attack on AES with 3 measurements. The attack has
a probability of 0.42 and needs 4.24 PC hours post-processing. This is to
be compared to 40 measurements with some non-negligible post-processing
in [50] for a success probability > 0.5 and 6 measurements with approx. 237.15
1This means that for polynomials f1, . . . , fm ∈ R = F[X ] there are g1, . . . , gm ∈ R such
that
∑
giDF (fi) = 0 and
∑
gifi 6= 0.
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oﬄine computations and a success probability of 0.85 or 5 measurements with
245.5 oﬄine computations and a probability of 0.55 in [10]. To solve the sys-
tems of polynomial equations derived from generalized internal collisions, we
have used the Magma F4 algorithm implementation. As a future task, the
application of the F5 Gro¨bner basis algorithm [32] and PolyBoRy [12] could
be considered to solve these systems. Also, the application of algebraic col-
lision attacks to other cryptographic construction, as block ciphers, stream
ciphers, and message authentication codes, will be studied.
Finally, the combination of Gro¨bner basis algorithms with other methods
of cryptanalysis is an interesting topic for the further research.
Appendix A
Polynomial interpolation of the inverse S-Box of Rijndael
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89
+04x
88
+D9x
87
+
38x
86
+D3x
85
+B9x
84
+16x
83
+52x
82
+18x
81
+19x
80
+3Ex
79
+
9Ex
78
+03x
77
+56x
76
+A6x
75
+71x
74
+03x
73
+E4x
72
+86x
71
+
F5x
70
+B0x
69
+05x
68
+D1x
67
+10x
66
+E2x
65
+E5x
64
+CBx
63
+
B1x
62
+F2x
61
+8Ex
60
+C7x
59
+0Cx
58
+A7x
57
+BFx
56
+46x
55
+
0Bx
54
+01x
53
+C5x
52
+A3x
51
+50x
50
+77x
49
+EAx
48
+05x
47
+
65x
46
+8Ex
45
+89x
44
+D4x
43
+6Dx
42
+D3x
41
+75x
40
+65x
39
+
13x
38
+2Fx
37
+86x
36
+AFx
35
+7Cx
34
+7Bx
33
+85x
32
+C8x
31
+
E8x
30
+04x
29
+7Bx
28
+CFx
27
+2Fx
26
+8Ax
25
+9Ax
24
+3Dx
23
+
CFx
22
+21x
21
+39x
20
+D9x
19
+29x
18
+73x
17
+F6x
16
+23x
15
+
40x
14
+1Bx
13
+B2x
12
+C0x
11
+6Dx
10
+85x
9
+1Cx
8
+8Ax
7
+
2Cx
6
+BBx
5
+90x
4
+1Ex
3
+7Ex
2
+F3x
1
+52
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Appendix B
A DRL Gro¨bner basis for Flurry(32, 2, 4, f3, D2)
The following sequence of polynomials G is a degree-reverse lexicographic
Gro¨bner basis for a Flurry(32, 2, 4, f3, D2) for the following variable order-
ing:
x0 < x1 < x2 < x3 < x16 < x17 < x18 < x19 < x14 < x15 < k0 < k1 < k6 < k7 <
k2 < k3 < k4 < k5 < k8 < k9 < k10 < k11 < x4 < x5 < x6 < x7 < x8 < x9 < x10 <
x11 < x12 < x13
G = {
plaintext:
x0 + θ31 + θ29 + θ27 + θ24 + θ22 + θ21 + θ19 + θ13 + θ11 + θ8 + θ7 + θ6 + θ4 + 1
x1 + θ31 + θ30 + θ29 + θ22 + θ21 + θ15 + θ14 + θ11 + θ10 + θ7 + θ6 + θ5 + θ3 + θ
x2 + θ26 + θ25 + θ24 + θ21 + θ19 + θ18 + θ16 + θ14 + θ8 + θ7 + θ6 + θ4 + θ + 1
x3 + θ27 + θ26 + θ24 + θ21 + θ17 + θ15 + θ13 + θ11 + θ9 + θ6 + θ4 + θ
ciphertext:
x16 + θ31 + θ29 + θ21 + θ19 + θ18 + θ16 + θ15 + θ14 + θ12 + θ4 + 1
x17 + θ24 + θ21 + θ20 + θ18 + θ16 + θ13 + θ10 + θ9 + θ8 + θ6 + θ5 + θ3 + θ + 1
x18 + θ29 + θ25 + θ21 + θ20 + θ19 + θ13 + θ10 + θ9 + θ8 + θ7 + θ6 + θ5 + θ3
x19 + θ29 + θ27 + θ26 + θ20 + θ13 + θ10 + θ8 + θ5 + θ2
round 1:
x4 + x2
x5 + x3
k30 + k
2
0x2 + k0x
2
2 + x
3
2 + C1x7 + C1x6 + C1x1 + C1x0
k31 + k
2
1x3 + k1x
2
3 + x
3
3 + C2x7 + C1x6 + C2x1 + C1x0
round 2:
x8 + x6
x9 + x7
x36 + x
2
6k2 + x6k
2
2 + k
3
2 + C1x11 + C1x10 + C1x5 + C1x4
x37 + x
2
7k3 + x7k
2
3 + k
3
3 + C2x11 + C1x10 + C2x5 + C1x4
93
94 Appendix B
round 3:
x12 + x10
x13 + x11
x310 + x
2
10k4 + x10k
2
4 + k
3
4 + C1x9 + C1x8 + C1k9 + C1k8 + C1x15 + C1x14
x311 + x
2
11k5 + x11k
2
5 + k
3
5 + C2x9 + C1x8 + C2k9 + C1k8 + C2x15 + C1x14
round 4:
x14 + x16
x15 + x17
k36 + k
2
6x14 + k6x
2
14 + x
3
14 + C1x13 + C1x12 + C1k11 + C1k10 + C1x19 + C1x18
k37 + k
2
7x15 + k7x
2
15 + x
3
15 + C2x13 + C1x12 + C2k11 + C1k10 + C2x19 + C1x18
key expansion:
k11 + θ2k7 + (θ2 + θ + 1)k1 + θk0 + θ4 + θ2
k10 + θ2k6 + θk1 + k0 + θ3 + θ
k9 + (θ2 + θ)k7 + (θ + 1)k6 + θ2k1 + (θ + 1)k0 + θ6 + θ5 + θ3 + 1
k8 + (θ + 1)k7 + (θ + 1)k6 + (θ + 1)k1 + k0 + θ5 + θ3
k5 + (θ2 + θ + 1)k7 + θk6 + θ2k1 + (θ + 1)k0 + θ6 + θ4 + θ3 + θ
k4 + θk7 + k6 + (θ + 1)k1 + k0 + θ5 + θ4 + θ3 + 1
k3 + θ2k7 + (θ + 1)k6 + (θ2 + θ + 1)k1 + θk0 + θ6 + θ5 + θ4 + θ
k2 + (θ + 1)k7 + k6 + θk1 + k0 + θ5 + θ2 + θ + 1
}
with C1 = (θ + 1)−1 and C2 = 1 + (θ + 1)−1
Appendix C
Details about the Computational Platform for Experiments
Two chapters of this thesis provides with a diversity of experimental results.
Experimental Results given in Chapter 4 were obtained using the com-
puter algebra system Magma [53], version 2.11-8, on an AMD Athlon 64
3200+ equipped with 1024 Megabytes of RAM running Linux.
For Chapter 7 we implemented all our attacks in Magma V2.13-10 (in-
cluding the AES algorithm itself as well as its random inputs) running on a
dual-core AMD Opteron processor with 1 MB cache and clocked at 2613.39
MHz under Linux. We used only one execution thread of the Opteron proces-
sor and not more than 1 GB of RAM. Thus, it is claimed that the performance
figures of our attacks on a standard PC with a single-thread processor and 1
GB RAM are comparable to those given in this thesis.
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